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I. INTRODUCTION
"In this case, we confront one of the more complex kinds of
overlapping sovereignty that exists in the United States today: that
between the States and Indian tribes."'

With this statement, Judge Diane Wood, writing for a unanimous
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
began an opinion in a case marking a turning point in water pollution
regulation under the Clean Water Act. In Wisconsin v. EPA, the court
rejected the State of Wisconsin's challenge to the EPA's grant of

1. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2001).
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"Treatment as a State" status to the Sokaogon Chippewa Community
Indian Tribe for purposes of setting water quality standards under the
Clean Water Act. In doing so, the court confirmed what many in the
environmental field have suspected or suggested: Indian tribes with
"Treatment as a State" status are co-equal sovereign regulatory bodies
of the same class as individual states under the Clean Water Act. In
addition, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a state to
challenge a tribe's "Treatment as a State" designation.
This article reviews the Seventh Circuit's seemingly simplistic
decision over the complex issues in Wisconsin v. EPA with an eye
toward its repercussions for nationwide water pollution regulation. To
appreciate the implications of this decision, one must understand the
basic framework of the Clean Water Act, including the important role
of cooperative federalism in achieving the Act's goals. Accordingly,
Part I of this article reviews the fundamental components of the Clean
Water Act. Part II discusses the extension of the Clean Water Act's
cooperative federalism to Indian tribes, enabling qualified tribes to
exercise many of the same regulatory powers as states for waters within
reservation boundaries.
This discussion includes an important
examination of how a tribe qualifies for "Treatment as a State" status
and notions of "inherent authority." Part III reviews the facts in
Wisconsin v. EPA and maps the court of appeals' opinion. Part IV
assesses this case's implications, specifically focusing on the potentially
significant increase in tribal assertion of authority under the Clean
Water Act and the tremendous difficulty that states face in challenging
a tribe's "Treatment as a State" designation.
Part V considers
watershed management as an alternative approach that may be better
suited for comprehensive and cooperative water pollution regulation.
The author argues four main points: (1) the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Wisconsin v. EPA was correct as a matter of law; (2) more tribes will
be seeking "Treatment as a State" status to administer water quality
standards; (3) the court's opinion in Wisconsin v. EPA has eliminated
most of the viable challenges a state may make in opposition to the
grant of "Treatment as a State" status to a tribe; and (4) a potential
influx of additional water pollution regulatory authorities is of
questionable value to the Clean Water Act's operation which may be
better served by basing regulation on hydrological boundaries rather
than political borders.
H. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 was the federal
government's first, albeit modest, attempt to statutorily regulate water
pollution in the twentieth century. The Act was revised numerous
times between its enactment and 1971.' As a whole, however, this
2. Id.
3. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 222 (2d ed.
2001).
4. EPA v. California ex ret State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 n.2
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initial attempt to control water pollution was flawed, deficient, and
ineffective in many ways.5 The situation came to a head in 1971 when
the Senate Public Works Committee concluded, "the national effort to
abate and control water pollution has been inadequate in every vital
aspect.
In response to this finding, Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972.'
In 1977, after
additional amendments were enacted, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act became known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act").9
The Supreme Court described the CWA as "an all encompassing
program of water pollution regulation... [whose] 'major purpose...'
was to 'establish a comprehensive long range policy for the elimination
of water pollution'."" The statute itself proclaims that its overarching
and lofty objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."" To reach this
objective, the CWA sets forth specific attainment goals including: (1)
eliminating pollutant discharge into navigable waters; (2) achieving an

(1976).
5. See id. at 202-03. The United States Supreme Court explained the specific
problems with the statute before 1972:
[T]he Federal Water Pollution Control Act employed ambient water quality
standards specifying the acceptable levels of pollution in a State's interstate
navigable waters as the primary mechanism in its program for the control of
water pollution. This program based on water quality standards, which were
to serve both to guide performance by polluters and to trigger legal action to
abate pollution, proved ineffective. The problems stemmed from the
character of the standards themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects
rather than the preventable causes of water pollution, from the awkwardly
shared federal and state responsibility for promulgating such standards, and
from the cumbrous enforcement procedures. These combined to make it
very difficult to develop and enforce standards to govern the conduct of
individual polluters.
Id. Professor Ferrey further described the statute's ineffectiveness:
Prior to 1972, enforcement of water pollution violations was difficult because
enforcement depended on a discharger's ability to reduce the ambient water
3uality of the receiving waters below a specific level....
Given multiple
ischarges to many water bodies, the agency's burden in proving which
discharger was the sole cause of pollution was nearly impossible.
FERREY, supra note 3, at 222-23. See also Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268
F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2001) ("This water quality standard scheme.., was plagued by
many problems. Significantly, it was often difficult to formulate precise water quality
standards and even more difficult to prove that a particular operator's discharge
reduced water quality below these standards.").
6. Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failureof Enforcement in the
Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (quoting S. REp. No. 92-414
(1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674).
7. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204.
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972). After a "long and contentious" debate, the amendments were
enacted over a presidential veto on October 18, 1972. William A. Anderson, II & Eric
P. Gotting, Taken in Over Intake Structures? Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 26
CoLuM.J. ENvrL. L. 1, 9 n.49 (2001).
9. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Flatt, supra
note 6, at 6 n.31.
10. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
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interim water quality goal wherever attainable, which provides for fish,
shellfish, and wildlife protection and propagation and recreation in
and on the water (often referred to as the "fishable & swimmable"
goal) ;12 and (3) prohibiting toxic pollutant discharge in toxic
amounts.'" From these admirable ambitions, one can discern that the
ultimate aim of the CWA is the tall order of eliminating pollutant
discharges into United States waterways.14
A. MEETING THE CWA'S GOALS: EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS

In order to work toward the CWA's objectives, there must be a way
to gauge the "quality" of the Nation's waters and the pollutants that
enter them. Without this ability, realistic regulatory enforcement has
proved unworkable.' 5
Therefore, the CWA's new regulatory
framework included a new set of "measuring tools." The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained the role and function of these
new tools as follows:
The Clean Water Act provides two measures of water quality. One
measure is an "effluent limitations guideline." Effluent limitations
gidelines are uniform, technology-based standards promulgated by
te EPA, which restrict the quantities, rates and concentrations of
specified substances discharged from point sources.
The other
measure of water quality is a "water quality standard." Unlike the
technology-based effluent limitations guidelines, water quality
standards are not based on pollution control technologies, but
express the desired condition or use of a particular waterway. Water
quality standards supplement technology-based effluent limitations
guidelines "so that numerous point sources, despite individual
compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to
levels."'
prevent water quality from falling below acceptable
Thus, the CWA is generally concerned with regulating levels of

pollutants dischargedfrom point sources'7 (i.e., effluent limitations) and
12. Robert W. Adler, IntegratedApproaches to Water Pollution:Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 23 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 203, 209 n.35 (1999).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(3). The CWA's introduction sets forth a total of seven
national "goals" and "policies." Two "goals" set specific attainment target dates. Total
elimination of pollutant discharge into the navigable waters was targeted to be
accomplished by 1985. The attainment date for the establishment of water quality
providing for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
providing for recreation in and on the water was July 1, 1983. Neither of these
deadlines were met. FERREY, supra note 3, at 224.
14. Flatt, supra note 6, at 8.
15. See supra text accompanying note 5.
16. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
17. "Point sources" are defined as "any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14). A "nonpoint source" includes "everything that is not a 'point
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establishing pollution limits for navigable water bodies that receive
pollutant discharges (i.e., water quality standards). These two gauges
form the basis for virtually all water pollution control under the CWA.
1. Effluent Limitations and the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
is the heart of the CWA's enforcement regime.
The NPDES
mechanism "provides for the issuance of discharge permits ("NPDES
permits") that allow the holder to discharge pollutants at levels below
thresholds incorporated in the permit."' The permit system is the
means of achieving and enforcing the technology-based effluent
limitations by specifically identifying to the polluter what may be
legally expelled from an end-pipe into a waterbody. ° The EPA
promulgates effluent limitation guidelines using the latest scientific
knowledge" and after carefully considering various statutorily
prescribed factors. 2 By following the terms of their NPDES discharge
permits, permit holders can avoid liability under the CWA. 5
At first blush, the idea that the CWA grants "licenses to pollute"
seems squarely at odds with the Act's goal of eliminating pollutant
discharge into navigable waters.24 Yet, the CWA is a careful mix of
absolutist language and carved-out exceptions. Section 301, known as
the "centerpiece of the CWA,"" demonstrates this, stating "[e]xcept as
in compliance with this section and [other sections of the Act], the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."26 Thus,
source' or not associated with a discrete point of discharge." FERREY, supra note 3, at
217. Examples include discharges attributable to farming, construction, mining, and
urban runoff. Id. There tends to be disparate regulatory treatment of point sources
and nonpoint sources. "Consignment to the point source category brings attentive
regulation ....
Relegation to the nonpoint source group beings loose oversight."
Flatt, supra note 6, at 8 n.53 (citing WILuAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENviRONMrNTAL LAW §
4.5 at 303 (2d ed. 1994)). One reason for this may be that it is physically easier to
monitor discrete discharges from, for instance, pipes of a factory than it is to measure
runoff of polluted water into a waterbody. Another reason may be that nonpoint
source pollution generally emanates from land use; therefore, to mitigate such
pollution, land use activities must be controlled-often leading to an array of different
problems. FERRY, supra note 3, at 217, 452-456.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
19. Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2001).
20. EPA v. California ex reL State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204-05
(1976).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1).
22. When considering effluent limitation guidelines, the EPA must make three
essential determinations: "(1) whether the pollutant results from a non-point source
or a point source; (2) whether the pollutant is classified as conventional, nonconventional, or toxic; and (3) whether the discharger is a new or existing source of
pollution." Flatt, supra note 6, at 8.
23. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2001).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1); see also supratext accompanying note 13.
25. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 2000).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
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the CWA creates a scheme of strict liability for any pollutant discharge
unless the discharge fits into one of the CWA's limited exceptions.27
In reality, the only "exception" by which a pollutant discharger can
escape the strict liability of the CWA is by compliance with a valid
NPDES permit.28 Resultantly, the CWA regulatory regime does not
create an outright discharge ban, but instead establishes a
sophisticated discharge allowance system for polluters. 29 The ultimate
goal, however, has not been forsaken. The NPDES permit mechanism
contemplates a gradual progression of point source discharge
reduction using technology-based standards.0
The premise is that,
"[a]lthough Congress intended the CWA to lead to the long-term
elimination of pollutants in the nation's waterways, Congress
recognized the technological infeasibility of prohibiting all pollutants
in the short term."' Therefore, rather than unrealistically forcing an
immediate about-face by industry and other polluters, the CWA uses
NPDES permits to "progress toward the national goal of eliminating
the discharge of all pollutants."2 As pollution control technology
improves and ostensibly becomes more economical, such technology
will be incorporated into the tolerated pollutant limits in NPDES
permits. 2 Thus, rather than contravening the fundamental purpose of
the CWA, the "permits to pollute" are the monitoring tools used to
achieve it.3 4 "The availability of such permits simply recognizes 'that

27. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 265.
28. Id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)) ("The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the NPDES
permit to be the only means by which a discharger from a point source may escape the
total prohibition of [§] 301(a).").
29. Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2001).
There are two basic types of NPDES permits: (1) individual and (2) general. An
individual permit is specifically tailored to an individual facility using the detailed
information contained in the permit application. A general permit covers multiple
facilities within one category. It is a generally applicable permit, which covers
categories of point sources having common attributes. General permits may only be
issued to dischargers with similar characteristics located within a specific geographical
region. The idea behind the general permits is to promote efficiency by covering
similar dischargers under one preset permit rather that expending resources to issue
individual permits. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, National
Pollutant
Discharge
Elimination
System
Permit
Program,
at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/index.cfm?program-id=0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314.
31. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 265.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2)(A).
33. See id.§§ 1314(b) (1)(B), 1316(b) (1)(B).
34. Flatt, supra note 6.
The permits specify the control technology applicable to each pollutant, the
effluent limitations a discharger must meet, and the deadline for compliance.
Each pollutant then must be monitored, and the results submitted to EPA or
to another governing entity in periodic discharge monitoring reports
(DMRs). Permits under NPDES may be granted for no more than five years,
but are renewable thereafter.
Id.at 12 (internal citations omitted). See generally Amy E. Fortenberry, Moving
Violations: Violations of the Clean Water Act and Implicationsfor CERCLA 's
Federally Permitted
Release Exception, 24 B.C. ENVrL. A. L. REv. 821 (1997).
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pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any
inherent rights to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of
disposing of wastes'.""
Clearly, the NPDES permitting structure
constituted a major shift in mindset and procedure for both regulators
and dischargers.
In addition, the CWA allows the federal government to delegate to
state governments the authority to administer the NPDES program for
point sources located within a state." The EPA must approve any such
state program, 7 and once it does, the state is considered a "primacy
state" for CWA purposes." In the absence of an approved state
program, the EPA administers the NPDES permit program. 9 Even in
primacy states, the EPA retains power to both block issuance of any
NPDES permit to which it objects," and take enforcement action.
Importantly though, a primacy state may adopt discharge permit
conditions more stringent than those federally required." Thus, the
CWA sets up a system of "cooperative federalism,"" whereby the
federal government offers the states the opportunity to regulate
discharge limits so long as the state standards meet or exceed the
federal standards."
2. Water Quality Standards
In the simplest of terms, "[a] water quality standard defines the
water quality goals of a water body, or portion thereof, by designating
the use or uses to be made of the water 5 and by setting criteria
necessary to protect the uses."" When considering water quality
standards, the frame of reference is not what is being dischargedfrom
an end-pipe, but rather the water body into which such a pipe expels
pollutants.
Thus, water quality standards and technology-based
effluent limitations are, at least initially, distinct measuring tools.
35. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1375
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). See, e.g., Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing NPDES program administered by New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation which calls its program the State
Pollution Discharge Elimination System).
37. The requirements that a state must meet for EPA approval are set forth at 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b).
38. S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir.
1994).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i).
42. Id. § 1370; S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1427-28.
43. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at
1427 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
45. For a concise explanation of the "use designation" process seeJanet K. Baker,
Tribal Water Quality Standards:Are There Any Limits?, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 367,
372-73 (1997); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (2001).
46. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2.
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"Whereas technology-based and process-based controls are concerned
with the reduction of pollution at the source, the water quality
standards focus on the receiving waters and their designated uses.
These standards create a baseline for the level of a particular pollutant
that a body of water may tolerate."47 However, as will be more fully
explained below, in the end, water quality standards and effluent
limitations do not act in isolation but instead work together to form an
integrated water pollution control system. 8
While the EPA generally promulgates effluent limitations, the
states have the primary role in promulgating water quality standards.)
The EPA, however, provides states with substantial guidance in
developing water quality standards. The EPA develops criteria for
water quality reflecting the latest scientific knowledge and provides
such information to the states as guidance." States can utilize the
EPA's recommended water quality criteria or use other criteria for
which they have sound scientific support. 2 While the states very often
rely on the EPA's recommended criteria," they are also specifically
authorized to develop standards more stringent than those
recommended by the EPA. The CWA requires that states review their
water quality standards at least once every three years in a process
commonly known as "triennial review" to ensure that the standards
protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water, and
serve the purposes of the CWA.55 A state must provide notice and hold
47. Flatt, supra note 6, at 11 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
EPA's Office of Water explains the fundamentals of water quality standards as follows:
Water quality standards include designated uses for a water body (e.g., public
water supply, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreation); water quality
criteria necessary to support the designated uses; and a policy for preventing
degradation of the quality of water bodies. Water quality criteria include
numeric criteria for specific parameters (e.g., copper, chlorine, temperature,
pH); toxicity criteria to protect against the aggregate effects of toxic
pollutants; and narrative criteria that describe the desired condition of the
water body (e.g., free from visible oil sheen).
EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, Overview of the Water Quality
http://cfpub.epa.
at
Process,
Standards-to-Permits
gov/npdes/wqbasedpermitting/wqoverview.cfm?program id=2 (last modified Feb. 28,
2001).
48. See generally EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, Overview of
at
Process,
Standards-to-Permits
Quality
Water
the
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/wqbasedpermitting/wqoverview.cfm?program-id=2 (last
modified Feb. 28, 2001).
49. See33 U.S.C §§ 1311, 1314.
50. Id. § 1313(a)-(c); Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1993); 40 C.F.R. § 131.4.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 n.5
(10th Cir. 1996).
52. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419 n.5.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1314; Am. PaperInst., Inc., 996 F.2d at 349.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1); Am. PaperInst., Inc., 996 F.2d at 349. "Additionally, the
CWA directs states to consider a variety of competing policy concerns during these
reviews, including a waterway's 'use and value for public water supplies, propagation of
fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other
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a public hearing before any water quality standard is adopted or
revised.
The proposed water quality standards and supporting
analyses must be available to the public prior to the hearing to allow
for informed participation."
The EPA has the final word on a state's water quality standards.
After a state has followed the required procedures and revised or
adopted a new water quality standard, the state must submit said
standard to the EPA for review and approval along with the various
analyses the state employed in developing the standard." The CWA
requires the EPA to ensure that a state's standard is consistent with the
provisions of the Act. 9 Specifically, the EPA ensures that the state has
adopted criteria that protect the designated water uses, that the state
has followed its own legal procedure for revising or adopting
standards, and that the state's standards are based on appropriate data
and scientific analysis.6 If the EPA feels that a state's standard does
not pass muster under the CWA, it will notify the state and specify the
changes necessary for EPA approval' If the state does not adopt the
EPA's revisions within ninety days after notification, the EPA will itself
impose the standards on the state. 6 The EPA may also impose revised
or new water quality standards on a state "in any case" where the EPA
determines that the standard is necessary to meet the requirements of
the CWA.63 This illustrates that, notwithstanding the CWA's "shift in64
focus of environmental regulation towards the discharge of pollutants,
water quality standards still have an important role in the CWA
regulatory scheme." 5 Indeed, as will be seen, state water quality
standards are often at the heart of the extraterritorial conflicts
concerning water pollution control.
B. The Convergence of Water Quality Standards, Effluent Limitations,
and NPDES Permits
Water quality standards, technology-based effluent limitations, and
NPDES permits all work together in an integrated system to
accomplish the CWA's pollution reduction objectives. The NPDES
permit program is the "point of contact"6 between technology-based
effluent limitations and water quality standards. The simple reason is
purposes'." Id. at 349 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A)).
56. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10(e), 131.20(b).
57. Id. § 131.20(b).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A); 40 C.F.R. 131.20(c).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (3); 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(1).
60. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(2)-(4).

61. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (3); 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(b).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3)-(4).
63. Id. § 1313(c) (4) (B).
64. See supra text accompanying note 5.
65. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
66. John S. Harbison, The Downstream People: TreatingIndian Tribes as States Under the
Clean Water Act, 71 N.D. L. REv. 473, 477 (1995).
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that state water quality standards determine, in part, the allowable
effluent discharge for an NPDES permit. While case law and
commentary can agree on this point, they often seem to travel
confusingly divergent statutory paths to reach the same conclusion.
Although frustrating, such dissimilar explanations of the incorporation
of water quality standards in the NPDES permit procedure is
understandable. "The 1972 Act removed the requirement for a single
implementation plan from the definition of [water quality standards]
and replaced it with a series of somewhat confusing, overlapping
planning and implementation requirements spread throughout
various sections and subsections of the Act."6 7 With these hazards in
mind this article will try to take the least circuitous route in explaining
water quality standards under the NPDES permit program.
The starting point is section 302(a) of the CWA, which explains
that where the application of federal effluent limitations would
interfere with the attainment or maintenance of water quality
standards in a water body, the effluent limitations for contributing
point sources must be adjusted to promote the achievement of the
water quality standards. 6 Next, section 303(d) of the Act requires
individual states to adopt water quality standards, identify waters where
technology-based effluent limitations will be insufficient to meet water
quality standards, and limit pollutant discharge into those waters thus
preventing contravention of water quality standards. 69 Finally, section
301, which has been described as the "centerpiece of the Clean Water
Act," 70 requires that effluent limitations shall be achieved' as well as

"any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards... established pursuant to any State law.... "
Thus, section 301 "expressly identifies the achievement of state water
quality standards as one of the Act's central objectives. 01
Next, and perhaps most importantly, is the language of section 402
of the Act.74 This section governs the NPDES permit system,
irrespective of whether the EPA or a state is administering it. Section
402 allows issuance of NPDES discharge permits only upon the express
condition that the discharge meets the requirements of sections 301
and 302.7' As explained above, those sections require adherence to
67. Adler, supra note 12, at 215.

68. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1994).
69. Id. § 1313(d); see also, FERREY, supra note 3, at 221.
70. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 2000).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (A) (emphasis added).

72. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
73. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C); Arkansas v.Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 106 (1992) (emphasis
added).

74. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
75. Id. §1342 (a)(1). Section 402 also allows issuance of a permit prior to the
taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements (i.e., those
under §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343) if other conditions established by

the EPA in furtherance of the NPDES process are met. Id. "This provision gives EPA
considerable flexibility in framing the permit to achieve a desired reduction in
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state water quality standards. This shows how section 402 is the "point
of contact" between effluent limitations and water quality standards.
In addition, EPA regulations pointedly state that a discharge permit
may not be issued "[w] hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all
affected States." 6 At the end of this statutory maze, the ultimate result
is that NPDES permits must comply with sections 301 and 302 of the
CWA as well as with the EPA's regulations. Because these statutes and
regulations mandate adherence to state water quality standards,
NPDES effluent limitations are inextricably linked to state water
quality criteria."
The upshot of all this is that a discharge permit transforms
"'generally applicable effluent limitations and other standardsincluding those based on water quality-into obligations.., of the
individual discharger'." 8 Stated another way:
[T]he rubber hits the road when the state-created [water quality]
standards are used as the basis for specific effluent limitations in
NPDES permits.... [Ounce a water quality standard has been
promulgated, section 301 of the CWA requires all NPDES permits for
point sources Ao incorporate discharge limitations necessary to satisfy
that standard.
Thus, not only does a prospective pollutant discharger have to
demonstrate that it will individually comply with effluent limitation
guidelines; but also it must demonstrate that its discharge, in
combination with other sources of pollution to the water body, will not
interfere with the attainment of state water quality standards." Of
pollutant discharges," and acknowledges "Congress did not regard numeric effluent
limitations as the only permissible limitation on a discharger." Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In fact, as the Costle
court recognized, the other limitations Congress contemplated were water quality
standards. Id.
76. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2001).

77. See Fortenberry, supra note 34, at 829; see also EPA Office of Water, Office of
Wastewater Management, Overview of the Water Quality Standards-to-PermitsProcess, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/wqbasedpermitting/wqoverview.cfm?program-id=2 (last
modified Feb. 28, 2001).
When assessing point source discharges to determine whether controls based
on water quality standards are necessary, an NPDES permitting authority
should conduct an analysis to determine whether the discharge causes, has
the 'reasonable potential' to cause, or contributes to an excursion of any
water quality criteria in the receiving water. Where effluent limits based on
water quality standards are necessary, the permitting authority allocates
responsibility for controls through wasteload allocations and then effluent
limits in NPDES permits consistent with those wasteload allocations.
Id.
78. United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976)).
79. Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
80. See Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
("NPDES permits are therefore somewhat interdependent; the permitting authority
must account for the effluent discharge of others in calculating the appropriate levels
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course, if a prospective discharger's technology-based controls will be
sufficient to meet both federal effluent guidelines and state water
quality standards, that would normally be sufficient to obtain a
discharge permit."
However, a prospective discharge that would
comply with federal effluent limitations would nevertheless violate the
CWA if it hindered realization of state water quality standards." The
permitting agency can issue a permit only if it incorporates the more
stringent limitations, which exceed federal effluent guidelines and are
sufficient to satisfy state water quality standards."
The Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") provisions of the CWA
provide the general method of translating a state's water quality
standards into discharge permits." The TMDL program has been
described as "the intersection of the CWA's technology-based and
water quality-based components of regulation."
Under section
303(d) of the CWA, states and tribes with "Treatment as a State"
("TAS") status must develop lists of impaired water bodies within their
jurisdiction.86 "These impaired waters do not meet water quality
standards that states, territories, and authorized tribes have set for
them, even after point sources of pollution have installed the
minimum required levels of pollution control technology."87 Section
303(d) (1) (C) of the Act requires each state to set TMDLs for the
impaired waters identified. "A TMDL specifies the maximum amount
of a pollutant that a water body can receive and still meet water quality
standards, and allocates pollutant loadings among point and nonpoint
pollutant sources."89 The CWA requires "[s]uch load shall be
for an individual permit holder.").
81. Flatt, supranote 6, at 11.
82. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(a), 1313(d), 1341, 1342.
83. Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(a), 1313(d), 1341, 1342; see also Fortenberry, supra
note 34, at 830.
84. 33 U.S.C. §1313 (d).
85. J.B. Ruhl, The EnvironmentalLaw of Farms: 30 Years of Making a Mole Hill Out of a
Mountain, 31 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10203, 10211 n.115 (2001).
86. According to the EPA, the lack of water quality standard attainment continues
to be a major problem:
Over 40% of our assessed waters still do not meet the water quality standards
states, territories, and authorized tribes have set for them. This amounts to
over 20,000 individual river segments, lakes, and estuaries. These impaired
waters include approximately 300,000 miles of rivers and shorelines and
approximately 5 million acres of lakes-polluted mostly by sediments, excess
nutrients, and harmful microorganisms. An overwhelming majority of the
population-218 million-live within 10 miles of the impaired waters.
EPA Office of Water, Overview of Current Total Maximum Daily Load - TMDL - Program
and Regulations, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html (last modified
May 17, 2001).
87. Id.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
89. EPA Office of Water, Overview of Current Total Maximum Daily Load - TMDL Program and Regulations, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html (last
modified May 17, 2001); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d
91, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) ("In effect, a TMDL posts a limit on the total amount of a
pollutant a water body may receive over a period of time."); see also Ruhl, supra note
85, at 10212 n.119 ("Point sources implement the wasteload allocations within TMDLs
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established at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standardswith seasonal variations and a margin of safety which takes
into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality."" Thus, the TMDL
system is how the CWA attempts to convert the desired water quality
standards into practical discharge constraints allocated among the
various dischargers to a water body.91
It is evident at this point that individual states wield great power
over pollutant discharges from point sources located within their
borders. The states have the central role in determining water quality
standards, and state or EPA issued discharge permits must comply with
such standards. Consequently, a state's EPA approved adjustment of
water quality standards may single-handedly determine the ability of a
prospective discharger to obtain an NPDES permit. This demonstrates
that state authority under the CWA is not a mere facade without
substance or implication. To the contrary, the states' role in setting
water quality standards puts serious bite into the NPDES permit
system.
C. TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS: POLLUTION FLOWS DOWNSTREAM
There is nothing too surprising about a state's authority to regulate
point source discharges or water quality standards for water bodies
within its borders. Yet, it is very common for streams, lakes, rivers,
groundwater, and all other types of water bodies and waterways to
traverse the borders of more than one state. One of the fundamental
physical characteristics of water as a natural resource is its mobility.
Most pollutant discharges into a transboundary waterway do not simply
contaminate the local region around the discharge; instead, such
pollutants flow throughout the waters to which the original receiving
waterway is connected. Thus, for every waterway that crosses a border,
one state will be upstream and another downstream from the
through enforceable water quality-based discharge limits in NPDES permits authorized
under section 402 of the CWA.") (internal quotations omitted); see also supra text
accompanying note 77.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
91. There has been extensive litigation and controversy concerning the
development of TMDLs under the CWA.
While TMDLs have been required by the Clean Water Act since 1972, until
recently states, territories, authorized tribes, and EPA have not developed
many. Several years ago citizen organizations began bringing legal actions
against EPA seeking the listing of waters and development of TMDLs. To
date, there have been about 40 legal actions in 38 states. EPA is under court
order or consent decrees in many states to ensure that TMDLs are
established, either by the state or by EPA.
EPA Office of Water, Overuiew of Current Total Maximum Daily Load - TMDL - Program
and Regulations, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html (last modified
May 17, 2001). The EPA has promulgated new regulations to speed up the adoption
and effectuation of the TMDL framework. However, through an appropriations rider,
Congress has thus far prevented the Agency from spending any money to implement
the rule. Id. See generallyJonathan Z. Cannon, EPA and Congress (1994-2000): Who's
Been Yanking Whose Chain?,31 ELR NEws & ANALYSis 10942 (2001).
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discharge. Articulated from a more global perspective:
[A] fundamental ecological and economic truth [is that] in the
watersheds 2 in which we live, all of us are Upstream or Downstream
People, and most of us are both. As Upstream and Downstream
People, we exist in a complex web of ecological and economic
connections with our watersheds and with each other.
Since the CWA requires all fifty states to promulgate water quality
standards,94 there are at least fifty upstream and downstream
sovereigns with diverse interests in the water within their borders. The
problem plainly arises: what happens when a proposed upstream
discharge threatens to violate the water
95 quality standards of a
downstream state to which the water flows?
The United States Supreme Court answered this critical question
in the seminal case of Arkansas v. Oklahoma.6 In that case, the city of
Fayetteville, Arkansas applied to the EPA for an NPDES permit for a
new sewage treatment plant.97 The EPA was the permitting authority
because Arkansas was not authorized to administer its own NPDES
permit program at the time of the plant's completion." The EPA
issued the permit authorizing the discharge of up to half of the plant's
effluent into a stream in northwestern Arkansas. That stream's flow
passed through a series of creeks and eventually entered the Illinois
River at a point twenty-two miles upstream from the ArkansasOklahoma border.'
One of the conditions of the discharge permit
was "that if a study then underway indicated that more stringent
limitations were necessary to ensure compliance with Oklahoma's
92. The term "watershed" is often copiously used in academic discourse on
pollution control without ever informing the reader what it means. A watershed is:
the land area that drains water to a particular stream, river, or lake. It is a
land feature that can be identified by tracing a line along the highest
elevations between two areas on a map, often a ridge. Large watersheds, like
the Mississippi River basin contain thousands of smaller watersheds.
U.S.
Geological
Survey,
Water
Science
Glossary
of
Terms,
at
http://wwwga.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html
(last modified July 5,
2001).
"Watersheds are nature's boundaries. They are the areas that drain to water bodies,
including lakes, rivers, estuaries, wetlands, streams, and the surrounding landscape.
Ground water recharge areas are also considered." EPA Office of Water, Office of
Wetlands, Oceans, & Watersheds, EPA's Most Frequently Asked Questions Related to
Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/questions.html (last
modified Sept. 5, 2001).
93. Harbison, supra note 66, at 473.
94. 33U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A).
95. At this juncture, this article is not referring to upstream dischargers which
require a federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not limited
to, the construction or operation of facilities which may result in a pollutant discharge.
See id. § 1341 (a)(1). The special rules concerning a downstream state's voice in such
matters is discussed later in Part II(A) (2) of this article.

96. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 95.
Id.
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water quality standards, the permit would be modified to incorporate
those limits."'
Both Arkansas and Oklahoma sought judicial review. "Arkansas
argued that the Clean Water Act did not require an Arkansas point
source to comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards."'02
Oklahoma claimed the EPA permitted discharge in Arkansas violated
Oklahoma's water quality standards which provided that "no
degradation of water quality shall be allowed in the upper Illinois
River, including the portion of the river immediately downstream from
the state line."" Essentially, the court was faced with two questions.
The first was whether the EPA must apply the water quality standards
of downstream states when issuing a permit for a discharge in the
upstream state. The second question was if the CWA does not
statutorily requiresuch consideration by the permitting agency, does the
EPA still have the authority to mandate such compliance in its
regulations.'" The Court decided that it did not need to reach the
first question because its answer to the second question disposed of
Arkansas' challenge."' The Court held that even if the CWA does not
require upstream discharges to comply with downstream water quality
standards, the CWA does not limit the EPA's authority to direct such
compliance by regulation.' 6
In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the CWA does not
authorize a downstream state to veto a discharge allowed by an
upstream state simply because the downstream state alleges that its
water quality standards will be compromised. Citing its decision in
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court reiterated that a
downstream state's only recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator
when it is unhappy with the allowance of an upstream discharge.' 8 In
fact, the CWA sets forth a procedure that upstream states must follow
to alert any state whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a
permit. After such notification, section 402 of the CWA provides:

101. 1I
102. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 97. In addition to the condition in the EPA
granted discharge permit, upon Oklahoma's challenge of the permit to the EPA, the
Agency's ChiefJudicial Officer had ruled that the CWA required any discharge permit
be strict enough to meet downstate water quality standards. Id. at 96-97.
103. Id. at 95 (internal quotations omitted).
104. Id at 104. A third question the court faced concerned the water degradation
issues surrounding Oklahoma's challenge to the issuance of the permit and is not
relevant for this article. The Court also made clear at the outset that its answers to
these questions did not turn on whether a state or the EPA was the permitting
authority since the requirements and procedures for issuing discharge permits are the
same no matter which entity is administering the NPDES program. Id. at 102 n.7, 103,
105 n.10.
105. Id. at 104.
106. I at 105.
107. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
108. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 100 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490-91).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1994).
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[A]ny State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be
affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written
recommendations to the permitting State (and the [EPA]
Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any part
of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting
State.... the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the
[EPA] Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such
recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.' 0 e
In connection with this provision,

the CWA provides the EPA

Administrator broad discretion to set conditions for NPDES permits
issued by the EPA,"' and allows the Administrator to block the
issuance of a state discharge permit as being "outside the guidelines

and requirements of this chapter.""
Furthermore, as mentioned
above, the EPA's regulations bluntly state: "No permit may be
issued... [w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all
affected States."" 3 In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the EPA relied upon this
regulation
when issuing the discharge permit for the sewage treatment
4

plant."

The Court connected the wide discretionary latitude given to the
EPA Administrator in the Act with the EPA's regulatory mandate that
upstream discharges may not violate downstream water quality
standards. In so doing, the Court concluded that:
The regulations relied on by the EPA were a perfectly reasonable
exercise of the Agency's statutory discretion. The application of state
water quality standards in the interstate context is wholly consistent
with the Act's broad purpose "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."... [T]he
achievement of state water quality standards [is] one of the Act's
central objectives. The Agency's regulationsthis
conditioning
NPDES
goal.
permits are a well-tailored means of achieng
The Court clarified that although the CWA limits participation by an
affected state in permitting decisions (i.e., it can submit its
recommendations about, but cannot veto a proposed permit), such
limits "do not in any way constrain the EPA's authority to require 6a
point source to comply with downstream water quality standards."
This holding was a colossal event for water pollution control
throughout the United States. It was a firm proclamation that
110. Id. § 1342(b)(5). This procedure applies irrespective of whether the EPA or a
state is administering the permit program. See id. § 1342(a) (3).
111. See id. § 1342(a)(2); Arkansasv. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105.
112. 33U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2).
113. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2001). This prohibition applies irrespective of whether
the EPA or a state is administering the permit program. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. at 105 n.10; 40 C.F.R. § 123.25.
114. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105.
115. Id. at 105-106.
116. Id. at 106 (second emphasis added).
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pursuant to the EPA's regulations, a state or the EPA may not issue a
discharge permit if such discharge will violate another state's water
quality standards."7 Thus, the regulatory battle lines were drawn-the
borders of the individual states of the nation. After Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, the victors in this battle would generally be the more
vulnerable downstream states.
HI. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
AND INDIAN TRIBES
As explained thus far, the CWA, like many other federal statutes,"'
"anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal
Government, animated by a shared objective: 'to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."'" 9 Within this framework of cooperative federalism, states
have a choice between letting the federal government wholly regulate
water pollution of the navigable waters within the state or to selfMost states have
regulate with federal approval and oversight.2
water quality
to
setting
in
addition
and,
the
latter
option
chosen
standards as required by the CWA, have availed themselves of the
opportunity to administer their own NPDES programs. To date, all
but six states have EPA approved NPDES programs.
A. "TREATMENT AS A STATE" STATUS FOR INDIAN TRIBES

In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to extend this cooperative
Upon application
federalism framework to include Indian tribes.'
and aPProval by the EPA, an Indian tribe may receive "Treatment as a
State" 2 ("TAS") status for purposes of the CWA." 4 The implications of
117. This is the general rule, and unless the EPA allows a variance, both the EPA
and state permitting authorities must comply with this admonition. Certain types of
variances are permitted under the EPA's regulations. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.25,
124.51(b), 124.62, 131.13.
118. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) and cases cited
therein discussing other statutes incorporating cooperative federalism mechanisms.
119. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
120. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1988).
121. The only states that currently do not have approved NPDES programs are
Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico. Puerto Rico
also does not have an approved program. Interestingly, the Virgin Islands had a
permit program approved in 1976. In 1998, Texas became the most recent state to
obtain approval. All of the approved states (but not the Virgin Islands) also have an
approved "general permits" program. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater
at
Status,
Program
State
Management,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm?program-id=12 (last modified Mar. 3,
2001); see also supratext accompanying note 29.
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
123. The "Treatment as a State" terminology was recently changed to "treatment in
the same manner as a State" in response to tribes objecting to the original phrase.
"Many tribes commented that they are not 'States'; rather, they have a unique
relationship with the United States Government." EPA Office of Water, American
Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide, Chapter Three: EPA's Approach to
at
Country,
Indian
in
Protection
Environmental
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a TAS designation are exactly as the name implies, a tribe will have the
same regulatory opportunities as a state under the CWA. Specifically,
a tribe may receive TAS status for purposes of:
(a) research, investigations, training, and information under section
104; (b) grants for pollution control programs under section 106; (c)
water quality standards and implementation plans under section 303;
(d) reports on water quality under section 305; (e) reporting
requirements under section 308; (f) enforcement of standards under
section 309; (g) clean lake programs under section 314; (h) nonpoint
source management programs under section 319; (i) certification
under section 401 that federally issued permits or licenses will be in
compliance with water quality standards; (j) issuance of NPDES
permits under sectionsection
402; and
404. %) issuance of permits for dredged
or fill material under
A tribe may receive TAS status for some or all of these CWA provisions
depending on what the tribe applies for and what the EPA approves. 6
A number of tribes have seized upon the opportunity to become an
integral player in water pollution control by seeking TAS status for
some of the allowable purposes 7 The most important functions
mentioned for which a tribe can obtain TAS status are the opportunity
to set water quality standards and implementation plans under section
303; the responsibility under section 401 to certify that federally issued
permits or licenses will be in compliance with tribal water quality
standards; and the power to issue NPDES permits under section 402 .
These will be examined in turn.
1. Section 303: Water Quality Standards
The tribes obtain a powerful regulatory tool with the ability to set
water quality standards. It enables a tribe to supplement the federally
set effluent limitations with EPA approved water quality standards.
Also, identical to the implications when a state sets water quality
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chap3.htm#86

(last visited Jan. 14, 2002); see

also EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Laws Regulations &

Guidance, at http://www.epa.gov/indian/treatst.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2002) ("The
term 'treatment-as-a-State' is somewhat misleading and may be offensive to tribes.").
124. This concept is not unique to the CWA. Indian tribes may also receive
"Treatment as a State" status under the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Air Act for
certain types of program authorizations and grant awards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11,
7601(d).
125. Jane Marx et al., TribalJurisdictionOver Reservation Water Quality and Quantity, 43
S.D. L. REv. 315, 329 (1998); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); Amendments to the Water
Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 54
Fed. Reg. 39,098 (Sept. 22, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
126. See, e.g.,
Paul G.Kent, EPA Approves Treatment as a State Statusfor Mole Lake Tribe Other ApplicationsPending,2 Wis. ENVrL COMPLIANCE UPDATE Issue 11 (Nov. 1995).
127. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of
Tribes
in the Same Manner as States/Program Approval Matrix, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998). No tribe has
applied for TAS status for all of the permissible purposes under the CWA. Id.
128. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 126.
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standards, a prospective pollutant discharge that would be in
compliance with federal effluent limitations would nevertheless be
unlawful under the CWA if it hinders realization of a TAS tribe's water
quality standards. In such a situation, an NPDES permit for a
prospective discharger on reservation land may be issued only if
effluent limitations are incorporated that exceed the federal
guidelines and protect tribal water quality standards. It is generally
recognized that not only do Indian tribes commonly adopt water
quality standards requiring more stringent effluent limitations than
federally required, but also tribal water quality standards are usually
more restrictive than even the state standards in which the reservations
are located.'2
2. Section 401: Certification of Compliance with Water Quality
Standards
As a counterpart to TAS designation for administering water
quality standards, a tribe will also be subject to the responsibilities of
section 401 of the CWA. Section 401 provides:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of
facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters,
shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from
the State in which the discharge originates or will originate ...that
any such discharge13 will comply with [effluent limitations and water
quality standards].
Section 401, therefore, obligates states and TAS designated tribes to
grant or deny certification for federally permitted or licensed activities
that may result in a discharge into navigable waters within its borders.
As explained by the EPA:
The decision to grant or deny certification is based on a State
determination regarding whether the proposed activity will comply
with, among other things, applicable water quality standards. States
and Tribes qualifying for treatment as States may thus deny
certification and prohibit the federal permitting or licensing agency
from issuing a permit or license for activities that will violate water

129. See, e.g., id. The EPA permits TAS tribes great leeway in setting water quality
standards. In fact, the "EPA believes that criteria sufficiently stringent to meet the
fishable and swimmable goals may not be disapproved under the CWA, on the
grounds that such criteria are more stringent than natural background water quality."
Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2). For an extensive review and critique of the
EPA's position, see Mark A. Bilut, Albuquerque v. Browner, Native American Tribal
Authority Under the Clean Water Act: Raging Like A River Out of Control, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 887, 898 (1994).

130. 33U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

Issue 2

WISCONSIN V. EPA

quality standards."'
In addition, a TAS tribe that is downstream from a proposed
discharge activity under section 401 may protest a certification by the
originatingupstream state when the downstream TAS tribe determines
that "the proposed activity would violate its water quality
requirements.
When the EPA receives a federal license or permit
application accompanied by a certification under section 401(a) (1)
from the state in which the discharge originates, the EPA must notify

other states and TAS tribes whose water quality may also be affected by
the discharge "certified" by the originating upstream state. 3 If a state
or TAS tribe then objects to the permit issuance because the
extraterritorial effect of the applicant's discharge will violate the state
or tribal water quality standards, a series of procedural mechanisms
begin. The end result is that the federal agency "shall condition such
[federal] license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to
insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements [of the
downstream state or TAS tribe]. If the imposition of conditions
cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such
license or permit."'34 Thus, a downstream TAS tribe's water quality
standards may, in effect, bar upstream activity subject to federal
licenses or permits. The authority to set water quality standards is
clearly a powerful tool.
It makes sense that a tribe's capacity to "certify" compliance with its
water quality standards (or protest another state's certification) goes
hand-in-hand with its authority to set water quality standards.
Standards with which to "certify" compliance must exist. In fact, when
the EPA approves a tribe's TAS designation for purposes of section 303
(water quality standards) and section 401 (certification) it does so
simultaneously and combines each approval into one category of TAS
authorization (i.e., EPA approval of TAS status for sections 303/401
purposes)."' To date, the EPA has granted only a small fraction of
eligible tribes such authorization. Of the 145 tribes who have applied
and been approved for TAS designation for at least one CWA activity,
twenty-one have been approved for sections 303/401 purposes and

131. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,890.

132. Id. at 64,876; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2).
134. Id.; see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992) ("Section 401(a) (2)
appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal license or permit over the objection of
an affected State unless compliance with the affected State's water quality
requirements can be ensured.").
135. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of
Tribes in
the
Same Manner as States/Program Approval Matrix,
at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998); see also 40 C.F.R
§ 131.4(c) (2001) ("Where EPA determines that a Tribe is eligible to the same extent
as a State for purposes of water quality standards, the Tribe likewise is eligible to the

same extent as a State for purposes of certifications conducted under Clean Water Act
section 401.").
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sixteen have applications pending."'
3. Section 402: NPDES Permits
Finally, tribes may receive TAS status for purposes of administering
an NPDES program under section 402 for discharges within the
boundaries of the Indian reservation. 7 Interestingly though, the EPA
has not authorized any tribes to issue discharge permits. 138 In fact, only
two tribes have even applied to receive such authorization and their
applications are still pending. 1 9 There may be many reasons for the
dearth of requests for section 402 authorization, including a choice by
tribes to allocate limited resources to other purposes for which they
desire TAS designation.'40 Perhaps the most obvious explanation is
that tribes simply do not need such authorization in order to protect
their water resources. In the absence of an approved tribal NPDES
program, the EPA bears the burden of administering the permit
program for discharges within the boundaries of Indian reservations.'
Once a tribe has authorization to set water quality standards, the
conditions in any discharge permit issued by the EPA for reservation
point sources must be sufficient to satisfy such standards.12 The result
is the enforcement of tribal water quality standards through an EPA
administered NPDES permit program. Thus, the tribe accomplishes
its regulatory goal without bearing the additional costs and
administrative burdens of operating the permit program.

136. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of
Tribes in
the Same Manner as States/Program Approval Matrix, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998). Results from
the 1990 census showed 278 federally recognized Indian reservations. EPA Office of
Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide, Chapter One:
Understanding Native Americans, at http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chapl.htm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2002).

137. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
138. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, State and Tribal
ProgramIssues, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/issues.cfmprogramid=12
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001).
139. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of Tribes
in
the
Same
Manner
as
States/Program
Approval
Matrix,
at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998).
140. In discussing a tribe's capability to manage water quality standards, the EPA
explained that tribes need to "give serious consideration" to the "resource impacts"
and "annual resource commitments" of assuming such a burden. Amendments to the
Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations,
56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,883 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); see also 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2). Such considerations seem equally important for a TAS tribe
considering whether to apply for NPDES permitting authority which would also
require significant resources.
141. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, State and Tribal
Program Issues, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/issues.cfm?programid=12
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992).
142. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 103.
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B. ALBUQUERQUE V. BROWNER "TREATMENT AS A STATE" REALLYMEANS
TREATMENT AS A STATE

In the real world of pollution control, of what relevance is the
above discussion concerning TAS designation for water quality
standards and certification of compliance? Can it really be that a TAS
tribe is a co-equal sovereign with states for water pollution regulation,
or is there some "catch"? A review of the important case of Albuquerque
v. Brownd 4 3 answers these questions and illustrates why TAS status
really matters.
In Albuquerque v. Browner, the EPA granted the Isleta Pueblo Indian
Tribe TAS status to administer water quality standards and to certify
compliance with such standards (i.e., sections 303/401 authorization)
for waters located within its reservation in New Mexico.'" The tribe
proposed, and the EPA approved water quality standards for the
portion of the Rio Grande River that flows through the reservation.
Not unexpectedly, the tribe's standards were more stringent than both
the federal minimums and those set by the state of New Mexico.'45
The city of Albuquerque ("City") operated a waste treatment
facility that created a point source discharge on the Rio Grande
approximately five miles north of the Isleta Pueblo Reservation. The
EPA issued a permit that authorized the facility's discharge, 46 so the
plant was considered a federally licensed or permitted facility under
section 401 of the CWA. Consequently, the Isleta tribe should have
received two forms of protection if it was, in practice, to be treated as a
state. First, the permitting authority (the EPA in this case) would not
be allowed to issue a discharge permit for the treatment facility,
pursuant to EPA's regulations and Arkansas v. Oklahoma, if the
discharge would violate a downstream TAS tribe's water quality
standards.

Second, because Albuquerque's plant required a federal

license or permit, it would fall under the purview of section 401, again
requiring the imposition of conditions to insure compliance with
downstream water quality standards.
The City filed suit against the EPA contending, among other
things, that section 518 "does not allow tribes to establish water quality
standards more stringent than federal standards and does not permit
tribal standards to be enforced beyond tribal reservation
boundaries."'47 With respect to its first argument, the City asserted that
section 518 specifically listed the authorized functions for a TAS tribe
under the CWA and section 510 was not included as one of the
authorized functions.1 48 That section of the Act allows a state to set
143. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
144. 1l at 419.
145. Id, at 419, 421.
146. Id at 419. Recall that New Mexico is one of the few states that has not been
authorized to administer its own NPDES permit system. See supra text accompanying
note 121.
147. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 421.
148. Id. at 423.
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water quality standards more stringent than the federal minimums. 4 1
The City's argument, therefore, was the familiar doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alteriusr, that inclusion of specific functions in the
statute necessarily excludes functions not mentioned.' Since section
510 was excluded from section 518, the City argued, TAS tribes were
not authorized to set
water quality standards more stringent than the
51
federal minimums.1
The EPA countered the City's position by pointing out that section
510 was merely a savings clause recognizing authority already
possessed by the state. ' "Because a savings clause confers no new
authority, but instead clarifies existing authority [that] is not
preempted [by the CWA], it was not necessary for Congress to
specifically reference section 510 when it authorized the [EPA]
Administrator to treat tribes as states." 1 3 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit agreed that it was unnecessary to incorporate section
510 into section 518 to give tribes powers to set more stringent water
quality standards because "Indian tribes have residual sovereign
powers that already guaranteethe powers enumerated in [section 510],
absent an express ... elimination of those powers." 5' In addition,
although not expressly articulated by the court, one commentator
noted the strongest and most obvious reason to interpret the CWA as
allowing tribes to set more stringent standards than the federal
minimums:
[I]t would make little sense for Congress to create section 518 as part
of the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments, but give tribes no power to
adopt stringent water quality standards.... If viewed as the City
argues, section 518 would be an illusory delegation of power, since
tribes would be unable to adopt more stringent standards and the
[CWA prohibits] the adoption of standards less stringent than the
federal criteria. As such, [tribes] would only be able to adopt
standards neither more nor less stringent then federal standards, and
this would render section 518 meaningless.

In Albuquerque v. Browner, the court of appeals made clear that section
518 was not an illusory delegation of power and that TAS tribes do
indeed have the same authority as states to adopt water quality
standards more stringent than the federal minimums.
The City's second argument that tribal water quality standards
could not be enforced beyond reservation boundaries was a flashback
to Arkansas v. Oklahoma. Recall in that case, the Supreme Court held

149. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998).
151.

Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Bilut, supranote 129, at 898.
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423 (emphasis added).
Bilut, supranote 129, at 899.

156.

Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423.
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that it was within the EPA's statutory discretion to promulgate and
enforce regulations requiring upstream point source discharges to
comply with downstream water quality standards. Now, the moment of
truth had arrived for Indian tribes: could TAS tribal water quality
standards receive similar protection from upstream discharges?
The court of appeals resoundingly answered that question in the
affirmative based primarily on the fact that tribes, like individual states,
are not the sovereign imposing their water quality standards on the
upstream dischargers. 5 It was the EPA exercising its authority through
its valid regulations requiring such compliance.'
Furthermore,
section 518 incorporated the relevant NPDES statutory provisions,
construed in Arkansas v. Oklahoma to allow the EPA to require
upstream dischargers to comply with downstream water quality
standards. 9
The important thing to take away from Albuquerque v. Browner is
that it made crystal clear that TAS tribes would be afforded identical
rights and powers as actual states for authorized purposes under the
CWA. TAS tribes are not second-class sovereigns, 160 but instead are
bestowed with the statutory tools to make a major impact on
transboundary water regulation. Albuquerque v. Brownerconfirmed that
"Treatment as a State" really means treatment as a state.
C. OBTAINING "TREATMENT AS A STATE" STATUS

There is a specific process that tribes must follow to acquire TAS
status. In section 518(e) of the CWA, Congress set out the threshold
qualifications that a tribe must meet and directed the EPA to
promulgate final regulations to expound upon and effectuate TAS
designation. 6' On December 12, 1991, after full notice and comment
rulemaking, the EPA issued a final rule articulating: (1) the
procedures by which an Indian tribe may qualify for treatment as a
state for purposes of the CWA section 303 water quality standards and
section 401 certification programs; and (2) a mechanism to resolve
unreasonable consequences that may arise from Indian tribes and
157. Id. at 424.
158. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2001). Of course, this concept is somewhat of a legal
fiction; hence its importance and constant reiteration throughout this article. The
practical effect of the EPA's regulations is that a downstream state or TAS tribe will
indeed be imposing its water quality standards on the upstream discharger. But, this is
only made possible by the EPA's (i.e., the federal government's) regulations requiring
upstream permits to comply with downstream water quality standards. If the EPA
decided to repeal or amend its regulations, a downstream state would have no
authority to veto upstream discharge permits which would result in the contravention
of downstream water quality standards. By focusing on this argument in Albuquerque v.
Browner, the court avoided heavy reliance on the second Montanaexception (discussed
infra Part II.C). See Andrea K. Leisy, Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and the Clean Water Act:
The Effect of Tribal Water Quality Standards on Non-Indian Lands Located Both Within and
Outside Reservation Boundaries,29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 139, 166 (1999).
159. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 424 n.13.
160. See Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
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states setting differing water quality standards on common bodies of
water.' 62
In these regulations, the EPA's TAS criteria track the threshold
qualifications specified by Congress in section 518(e) and add that the
applicant tribe must have federal recognition. The final rule states
that the EPA "may accept and approve a tribal application for
purposes of administering a water quality standards program if the
Tribe meets the following criteria:'
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

The Indian Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior...;
The Indian Tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers;
The water quality standards program to be administered by the
Indian Tribe pertains to the management and protection of
water resources which are within the borders of the Indian
reservation and held by the Indian Tribe, within the borders of
the Indian reservation and held by the United States in trust for
Indians, within the borders of the Indian reservation and held
by a member of the Indian tribe if such property interest is
subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within
the borders of the Indian reservation; and
The Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the
Regional Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the
functions of an effective water quality standards program in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the Act and
applicable regulations.64

The regulations go on to explain the information required to be
included in the TAS application submitted by the tribe to the EPA. Of
significance is the requirement that the tribe include "[a] descriptive
statement of the Indian tribe's authority to regulate water quality"165 in
order to satisfy the third requirement of the EPA's TAS criteria. That
162. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40
C.F.R pt. 131). In addition to requiring regulations specifying how Indian tribes shall
be treated as states under section 518, Congress explicitly required the EPA to provide
a dispute resolution mechanism of this type. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
163. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a) (2001).
164. Id. § 131.8(a)(1)-(4).
165. Id. § 131.8(b) (3).
This statement should include: (i) A map or legal description of the area
over which the Indian Tribe asserts authority to regulate surface water
quality; (ii) A statement by the Tribe's legal counsel (or equivalent official)
which describes the basis for the Tribes (sic] assertion of authority and which
may include a copy of documents such as Tribal constitutions, by-laws,

charters, executive orders, codes, ordinances, and/or resolutions which
support the Tribe's assertion of authority; and (iii) An identification of the
surface waters for which the Tribe proposes to establish water quality
standards.
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is, when are reservation waters sufficiently "held" by a tribe so that it
may have jurisdiction to set water quality standards for them?' This
becomes a crucial issue in Wisconsin's challenge to the EPA's grant of
TAS status to the Sokaogon Chippewa Community Indian Tribe and
requires exploration in more detail.
1. Inherent Tribal Authority
During the rulemaking process to develop qualifications for tribes
to receive TAS status to administer water quality standards " [ t] he issue
of whether and how EPA should require Tribes to demonstrate...
authority to regulate water quality within the boundaries of their
reservations, attracted significant comment."' 61 Some commentators
suggested the Tribes needed to submit detailed information and
reasons supporting their jurisdictional claims over the waters they
proposed to regulate and, in essence, start with a presumption against
their inherent authority.' 6 Predictably, "other commentators asserted
that Tribes invariably possess inherent authority to regulate all
reservation waters, and that EPA should presume the existence of such
authority and not require Tribes to make any specific factual
showing." 6 ' Clearly, the EPA's response is important to the Indian
tribes:
The inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes is a longstanding precept of
federal Indian law. The continued viability of tribal sovereignty,
exercised through the tribal governmental powers that have not been
diminished, is particularly relevant to the protection and
enhancement of the natural resources on which many tribes depend
for economic subsistence and cultural continuity. Water is perhaps

166. As discussed further below, the EPA found that section 518(e) as a whole was
not an explicit delegation of regulatory authority to Indian tribes. The phrase in the
third criterion concerning waters "otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation" has been interpreted by the EPA "as a separate category of water
resources and also as a modifier of the preceding three categories of water resources,
thus limiting the Tribe to acquiring [TAS] status for the four specified categories of
water resources within the borders of the reservation." Amendments to the Water
Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56
Fed. Reg. at 64,881. So, according to the EPA, this phrase simply designates another
category of water resources a tribe may be able to regulate after it provides sufficient
evidence of its inherent authority over such waters.
167. Id. at 64,877.
168. Id.
169. Id The specific context in which the debate arose was whether an Indian Tribe
may enforce its water quality standards against non-members of the tribe on nonIndian-owned fee lands within the boundaries of the reservation. In Wisconsin v. EPA,
266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001), none of the land within the Sokaogon Chippewa
Community Reservation was controlled or owned outright by non-members of the
tribe. The existence of fee land owned by non-tribal members on reservation land
may require a more studied appraisal of the tribe's TAS application, but does not alter
the standards the EPA will use to evaluate a tribe's authority over the water it proposes
to regulate.
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the most fundamental of such resources.170

In order to resolve these differing views of the necessity and method of
demonstrating inherent authority, the EPA considered and reconciled
Montana v. United States7 ' and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation."'
i. Montana v. united States- "The Montana Test"
In Montana v. United States, the Crow Tribe of Montana
attempted to prohibit non-Indians from hunting and fishing on all
lands within the reservation, including lands owned in fee simple by
non-Indians.7 7 The tribe believed it had authority to enact these
regulations based on its claimed ownership of the bed of the Big Horn
River, 74 the treaties which created the reservation, 3 and its inherent
power as a sovereign.
The Supreme Court squarely rejected the tribe's authority to enact
the regulation and refuted each of the tribe's underlying
justifications. 77 The Court held that absent express congressional
delegation "Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation." 78 The Court,
however, carved out two exceptions to this rule, commonly referred to
as the "Montana exceptions."'7
The Court held that "in certain
circumstances, even where Congress has not expressly authorized it,
Indian tribes retain sovereign power to exercise civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on fee lands." 80 The first exception permits tribes to
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members who enter into consensual
relationships with a tribe or its members through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.'
The second exception
permits tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-members whose
conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."8 2 For
170. Edmund J. Goodman, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Water Resources: Watersheds,
Ecosystems and Tribal Co-Management, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 185, 191-92

(2000).
171. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
172. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
173. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 544.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 544-46.
178. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. at 564).
179. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
180. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at
566).
181. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565.
182. Id at 566. Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning
that concepts of inherent sovereignty arise in the first instance when examining
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purposes of TAS designation and the CWA, the second exception is
critical.
Accordingly, if the EPA were to follow the Supreme Court's
interpretation of permissible tribal authority during the rulemaking, it
had three questions to pose. First, the EPA had to determine whether
Congress expressly delegated authority to tribes to regulate all reservation
waters. If yes, then the inquiry ended and there was no need to
evaluate inherent authority."83 However, if the EPA found that
Congress had not expressly delegated the authority to regulate all
reservation waters, it would have to consider whether either of the two
"Montanaexceptions" applied."'
In the context of water regulation, the first Montana exception
concerning consensual relations is generally inapplicable. Therefore,
the EPA would primarily evaluate whether the regulation of the water
involved conduct that threatened or had some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.' As will be explained in further detail below, because the
EPA determined that section 518 is not an express grant of authority to
tribes, the second Montana exception carries great weight in
determining a tribe's authority to regulate non-member conduct. 6
ii. BrendaleCauses Debate
During the rulemaking, there was considerable debate whether the
Montana standards remained intact or if the Supreme Court had
abrogated them in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Nation.'87 In that case, both the Yakima Nation and the state of
Washington "asserted authority to zone non-Indian real estate
developments on two parcels within the Yakima reservation, one in an
area that was primarily Tribal, the other in an area where much of the
land was owned in fee by nonmembers [of the tribe]. " "' In an
extensive and complicated opinion, the Court "split 4:2:3 in reaching
the decision that the Tribe should have exclusive zoning authority over
certain aspects of sovereignty Indian tribes have lost or retained throughout the years.
"[T]hrough their original incorporation into the United States as well as through
specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many attributes of
sovereignty." Id. at 563 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). In
sum, Indian tribes now have a "diminished status" as sovereigns. Id. at 565.
183. See Regina Cutler, To Clear the Muddy Waters: Tribal Regulatory Authority Under
Section 518 of the Clean Water Act, 29 ENvL. L. 721, 728 (1999) ("Under this analysis, an
appeal to inherent sovereignty as a basis for a tribe's civil regulatory jurisdiction is
unnecessary if Congress has directly delegated that authority to the tribe.").
184. Id.
185. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566.
186. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
187. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
188. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,877.
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property in the Tribal area and the State should have exclusive zoning
authority over non-Indian owned property in the fee area."18 9 Perhaps
because none of the three opinions in Brendae could agree on a
common approach for applying the second Montana exception, or
because neither of the two opinions representing the opinion of the
Court rely on Montana as the basis for their holding, many
commentators decreed that Brendale caused the death of Montana's
second exception."'
The EPA disagreed with this assessment of Brendale. It found that
the Supreme Court had not abrogated the viability of the Montana test,
but simply could not reach a consensus how to formulate the second
exception in the complicated factual scenario of Brendale "' Putting it
another way, "[a]lthough the Justices disagreed over how to apply
Montana'ssecond exception in [the Brendale] context, a majority of the
Justices nonetheless agreed that the Montana rule controlled." 92 The
EPA recognized, however, that in Brendaleseveral of the justices argued
that in order for inherent authority to arise under the second Montana
exception, the regulated activity's effect should be "demonstrably
serious."19
iii. The EPA's Resolution
At this point in the rulemaking, the EPA decided the Montana test
was still valid but that expressions by some Justices in Brendale
combined with statements made in subsequent opinions provoked
uncertainty as to what type of activity would trigger a tribe's inherent
authority under Montana's second exception. The EPA responded to
this predicament with a cautious, inclusive, and flexible approach:
In evaluating whether a tribe has authority to regulate a particular
activity on land owned in fee by nonmembers but located within a
reservation, EPA will examine the Tribe's authority in light of
evolving case law as reflected in Montana and Brendale. The extent
of such tribal authority depends on the effect of that activity on the
tribe....
[Tihe Agency will apply, as an interim operating rule, a
formulation of [the second Montana exception, i.e., inherent
authority] that will require a showing that the potential impacts of
regulated activities on the tribe are serious and substantial.
The choice of an Agency operating rule containing this standard is
taken solely as a matter of prudence in light of judicial uncertainty
and does not reflect an Agency endorsement of this standard per

189. Id.

190. Cutler, supra note 183, at 729; see also Amendments to the Water Quality
Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at
64,877.

191. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,877-78.
192. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
193. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878 (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, the EPA adopted a careful blend of Montana and Brendale,
perhaps on the hunch that further judicial development of the
inherent authority concept would yield the same result.
It appears that EPA was correct. In 1997, the Supreme Court
decided Strate v. A-1 Contractors'" in which Justice Ginsburg penned a
unanimous opinion resurrecting the Montana test from any perceived
erosion. In Strate, the Court disallowed tribal court jurisdiction over a
personal injury lawsuit resulting from an automobile accident
occurring between two non-members on a state highway running
through the Indian reservation."
The Supreme Court agreed the
dispute was "distinctly non-tribal in nature... [arising] between two
non-Indians involved in a run-of-the-mill highway accident."1 97 As such,
tribal jurisdiction was not connected to the self-governance of the
tribe. The Court held that because a tribe's inherent power does not
reach beyond what is necessary to protect self-government or to
control internal relations of the tribe,
9 8 the facts in this case could not
trigger Montana'ssecond exception.
It is still not entirely clear whether Justice Ginsburg's explanation
of Montana's second exception was a narrowing of its reach or merely a
clarification of the original rule designed to head off overuse.'" In any
event, this holding was important for two reasons. First, the EPA had
determined, during the rulemaking, that water quality management
protects public health and safety and, therefore, is critical to the selfgovernment of a tribe.2 °O Second, irrespective of how one interprets
Justice Ginsburg's statements, notions of protecting self-government
and internal relations reflect potentially "serious and substantial"
impacts on the tribe; the primary standard the EPA had used."' Thus,
in its rulemaking statements discussing "self-government" and "serious
194. Id. (first and second emphasis added).
195. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
196. Id. at 439. The state highway was a federally-granted right-of-way for which the
state paid the Tribes. Since the Tribes could no longer assert a landowner's right to
occupy and exclude over the property, the Court likened it to land within reservation
borders alienated to non-Indians in fee simple. Characterized as such, the Montana
test was clearly applicable. Id. at 455-56.
197. Id at 457 (internal indications omitted).
198. Id at 459.
199. Strate may arguably be read as a mere clarification of the original intent of the
Montanatest with Brendale being a complicated transitional case between Montana and
Strate. The most troublesome result of this reading is that while tribal "selfgovernment" and "internal relations" can easily be paralleled to "political integrity"
and "economic security," a disconnect results when trying to connect Montana's
"health or safety" component. The extremely convenient bridge for this gap was the
EPA's finding that water quality management protects public health and safety and,
therefore, is critical to the self-government of a tribe. See infra note 202.
200. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 64,878-79.
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and substantial effects," it appears the EPA's standards for applying
Montana's second exception foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
holding in Strate102 Moreover, it is evident Strate is exactly the type of
"evolving case law" the EPA hoped would arise to help guide the
Agency in its future decisions.
iv. The Montana Test and "Treatment as a State" Designation
To where does this arduous exploration lead? It leads back to the
original Montana test bolstered by the Supreme Court's indication that
the EPA's rule that the potential impacts must be "serious and
substantial" (indicated by threats to tribal self-government or internal
relations) to trigger inherent authority is on target. To simplify, the
following is the structure of the Montana test applied by the EPA:
A.
Did Congress expressly delegate authority to the tribes to
regulate the activity over all reservation land or waters?
If yes, then the tribe has express authority to exercise civil
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands and
there is no need to discuss inherent sovereignty.
B.
If no, does the activity fall into one of the two following
Montana exceptions?

(1)

It concerns activity relating to non-members who enter into
consensual relationships with the tribes or its members
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other
arrangements; or
(2) It concerns conduct that threatens or has a direct serious and
substantial effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Once it had established the proper framework of the Montana test, the
EPA could use it to evaluate section 518(e) of the CWA.
Under this test, the EPA's first query was whether section 518(e)
was an express delegation to qualified tribes of regulatory authority
over all reservation waters. More specifically, the EPA needed to
determine if the section resulted in expanding tribal authority and
jurisdiction over non-Indians.2 The statute itself is not explicit in this
regard so the EPA reviewed the legislative history. The legislative
history was conflicting and ambiguous, reflecting many of the perils of
straying beyond the text of a statute itself.2 4 Therefore, the EPA
202. Montanav. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
203. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards' Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,880.

204. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has recognized the hazards of relying
on legislative history:

One may say.., that legislative history is a poor guide to legislators' intent
because it is written by the staff rather than by members of Congress, because
it is often losers' history ("If you can't get your proposal into the bill, at least
write the legislative history to make it look as if you'd prevailed"), because it
becomes a crutch ("There's no need for us to vote on the amendment if we
can write a little legislative history"), because it complicates the task of
execution and obedience (neither judges nor those whose conduct is
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concluded that "[g]iven that the legislative history ultimately is
ambiguous and inconclusive, EPA believes that it should not find that
the statute expands or limits the scope of Tribal authority beyond that
inherent in the Tribe absent an express indication of Congressional
intent to do so."0 5 The EPA was saying section 518(e) is not an express
grant of additional authority to qualified tribes, but is only a
mechanism to recognize authority that they already possess. In light of
this finding, the EPA reached two important conclusions. The first was
that for a tribe to receive TAS status under the CWA, it would need to
have inherent authority over the waters it desired to regulate.2 6 That is,
the second Montana exception needed to be satisfied. The second
finding was that a tribe will need to make an affirmative demonstrationof
its inherent authority to the EPA.207 This had to be done by
completing the TAS application and providing verifying
documentation in support of the tribe's authority. In sum, according
to the EPA, section 518(e) authorized TAS treatment over activities
already within a tribe's inherent authority and the tribe must supply
proof that such authority exists.
v. The EPA's Presumption of Inherent Authority
At first glance, it appears there is a formidable roadblock to a tribe
obtaining TAS status. After all, the idea of inherent authority over an
activity that threatens or has a direct serious and substantial effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe is seemingly amorphous and malleable. Now, the EPA
supposed to be influenced by the law can know what to do without delving
into legislative recesses, a costly and uncertain process). Often there is so
much legislative history that a court can manipulate the meaning of a law by
choosing which snippets to emphasize and by putting hypothetical
questions--questions to be answered by inferences from speeches rather
than by reference to the text, so that great discretion devolves on the
(judicial) questioner.
In reSinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
205. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,880 (emphasis added).
206. At this point, this article becomes unconcerned with the first Montana
exception. The consensual relationship concept is much more clear-cut and unlikely
to give rise to complicated disputes. In any event, it is not a subject of EPA
deliberation during the TAS rulemaking process, nor is it at issue in Wisconsin v. EPA.
207. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,881
The Agency does not believe.., that it would be appropriate to recognize
Tribal authority and approve treatment as a State requests in the absence of
verifying documentation. In addition, in light of the legislative history of
section 518, the question of whether section 518(e) is an explicit delegation
of authority over non-Indians is not resolved. Therefore, the EPA does not
believe it is currently appropriate to eliminate the requirement that Tribes
make an affirmative demonstration of their regulatory authority. EPA will
authorize Tribes to exercise responsibility for the water quality standards
program once the Tribe shows that, in light of the factual circumstances and
the generalized findings EPA has made regarding reservation water quality, it
possess the requisite authority.
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required "proof' of such authority from the tribes. From the legalese
terminology to the desire for "evidence," it sounded almost as if the
intent was to intimidate tribes from applying for TAS designation.
To the contrary though, the EPA made the showing of inherent
authority quite easy. In fact, although the Agency makes the ultimate
decision concerning tribal jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis,"'8 "the
Agency presumes that, in general, Tribes are likely to possess the
authority to regulate activities affecting water quality on the
reservation. " 'O' The EPA provided numerous reasons for this
presumption including: (1) the Agency has "special expertise [in]
recognizing that clean water... is absolutely crucial to the survival of
many Indian reservations;"1 0 (2) the enactment of the CWA itself
constitutes a legislative finding that activities which affect water quality
"may have serious and substantial impacts,"21 (3) the mobile nature of
pollutants may cause serious and substantialimpacts even if they do not
originate on Indian owned lands;2 12 (4) Congress expressed a
preference for tribal regulation of reservation water quality;2 and (5)
water quality management protects public health and safety and,
therefore, is critical to self-government. 4 The EPA collectively labels
these: "generalized findings regarding the relationship of water quality
to tribal health and welfare."2 '
These generalized findings
"supplement[] the factual showing a tribe makes in applying for
treatment as a State."21 6 The obvious intent of this structure is to allow
an applicant tribe to meet the Montana second exception without
difficulty.
The EPA incorporated this intent into the TAS application
process. Recall the criteria •that the• regulations
require an applicant to
•
217
meet in order to receive TAS designation.
The EPA frankly admits
that to meet those requirements, a tribal application for TAS status
"will need to make a relatively simple showing of facts"21 8 asserting that:
"(1) there are waters within the reservation used by the tribe, (2) the
waters and critical habitat are subject to protection under CWA, and
(3) impairment of waters would have a serious and substantial effect
on the health and welfare of the tribe."219 Once the tribe meets this
208. Id. at 64,878, 64,881.
209. Id. at 64,881.
210. I& at 64,878.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
212. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878 (emphasis added).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 64,879 (emphasis added).
215. Id.; see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).
216. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879; see also Montana v. EPA, 137
F.3d at 1139.
217. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1)-(4) (2001).
218. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879.
219. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139.
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initial burden, the EPA will, in light of the facts presented by the tribe
and supplemented by the Agency's generalized findings regarding the
relationship of water to tribal health and welfare, presume an actual
showing of tribal jurisdiction over fee lands.2 0 Unless an appropriate
governmental entity demonstrates a tribe's lack of jurisdiction, the
EPA will find that the tribe has inherent authorit and will grant it TAS
status for administering water quality standards.2
D. OPPOSING A TRIBE'S APPLICATION FOR "TREATMENT AS A STATE"
STATUS

The EPA's regulations include a specific procedure for the EPA's
Regional Administrator to follow when processing an Indian tribe's
application for TAS status to administer water quality standards. 2 The
regulations require the Administrator provide "appropriate notice" to
"all appropriate governmental entities" within thirty days after receipt
of a tribe's TAS application.2 3 The notice "shall include information
on the substance and basis of the Tribe's assertion of authority to
regulate the quality of reservation waters."2 4 The governmental
entities have thirty days to submit comments on the tribal application
and the Administrator must consider such comments when evaluating
whether the tribe should be granted TAS status.22 5 This process is
important because, as discussed above, unless an appropriate
governmental entity can demonstrate that a tribe lacks jurisdiction
over reservation waters, the EPA will presume that the applicant tribe
has inherent authority to set water quality standards. The notice and
comment procedure is a governmental entity's primary opportunity to
oppose TAS status. The regulations raise two important questions: (1)
what exactly is an "appropriate governmental entity" permitted to
comment on the TAS application?; and (2) are there any limitations to
the permissible scope of the governmental entities' comments and
challenges to a TAS application? These questions will be addressed in
turn.
1. "Appropriate" Governmental Entities: Who May Challenge?
The concept of which governmental agencies are permitted to
comment on a tribe's TAS application is of great interest to any locale
or industry that may be affected by an Indian tribe being granted TAS
status to set water quality standards. In other words, under the EPA's
regulations, what is an "appropriate governmental entity?" There are
many state, county, local, and tribal governments that may have
important interests at stake if a particular tribe is given authority to set
220. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879.
221. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139.
222. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8.
223. Id. § 131.8(c) (2) (ii).
224. Id. § 131.8(c) (2) (i).
225. Id. §§ 131.8(c) (3), 131.8(c) (4).
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water quality standards for reservation waters. For instance, in
Albuquerque v. Browner, would the city of Albuquerque have been an
"appropriate governmental entity" entitled to comment on the Isleta
Pueblo Indian Tribe's assertion of authority to adopt water quality
standards for the Rio Grande water flowing through the reservation?
Does a state that is located three or four states upstream from the
reservation receive notice and comment privileges? What about a local
county government coordinating a "regional water reclamation
program? The result in Albuquerque v. Browner made clear that these
and other governmental entities may be drastically affected by the
imposition of tribal water quality standards if a TAS application is
approved.2
Recognizing this, during the notice and comment period for the
proposed regulations specifying the TAS criteria and application
processing procedures, several commentators requested clarification
227
of what would be considered "appropriate governmental entities."
The EPA responded that the phrase "appropriate governmental
entities" would be defined as "States, Tribes, and other Federal entities
located contiguous to the reservation of the Tribe which is applying
for treatment as a State."28 Thus, the EPA not only significantly
narrowed the type of governmental entity that could participate, but
also curtailed the number of participants by restricting the geographic
connection the entity must have with the tribe. Interestingly, the EPA
also decided that neighboring tribes will be treated as "appropriate
governmental
entities" whether or not they have obtained TAS
229
status.

With respect to local governments such as cities and counties, the
EPA excluded them from the definition of "appropriate governmental
entities." 3 ° Not only are these entities not entitled to notice under the
regulations, but also, if such governments catch wind of a pending
TAS application and submit comments challenging a tribe's assertion
of authority, the EPA will not consider such comments.2 1 However,
the EPA does encourage local governments to direct their comments
to the "appropriate State governments" which may then include such
concerns in any comments they chose to submit.2 2 To encourage such
involvement, the EPA stated that it would "make an effort to provide
notice to local governments by placing an announcement in
appropriate newspapers... [that] will advise interested parties to
direct comments on Tribal authority to appropriate State
226. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 424-26 (10th Cir. 1996).
227. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,884 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
228. Id.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,884.
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governments.""' s This appears to be a strangely contradictory element
of the EPA's policy. The Agency first says that local governments are
not "appropriate governmental agencies" and will not receive notice of
a TAS application or an opportunity to comment. Then, in the same
breath, it decides to provide publication notice to local governments
and encourages them to submit their comments to the EPA through
the state. Why not provide notice and an opportunity to directly
comment in the first instance? Or, at the very least, why not provide
local governments with the same type and quality of notice that it
provides to states,3 4 even if such notice only advises the local
government to direct comments to the state government? If not
internally inconsistent, the EPA's approach is, at best, inefficient. 25
Finally, the EPA clarified that the notice and comment procedure
for TAS applications is "not intended to establish any form of
adjudication or arbitration process to resolve differences between State
and Tribal governments."2 Instead, the comments are simply another
piece of information for the EPA to evaluate as it deliberates whether a
tribe has the requisite authority to receive TAS status. 23' The EPA thus
quashed any notions of the existence of a dispute resolution process
before TAS status is granted, and reinforced that the Agency is the sole
determiner of a tribe's eligibility for TAS designation.
2. Limitations: What May Be Challenged?'
Once it was determined that states, tribes, and other federal
entities would be the only participants in the notice and comment
process, the question arose as to about what, exactly, the EPA would
permit these parties to comment. In practical terms, the question
became: what type of objections would the EPA consider in opposition
to a tribe's TAS application and what, if anything, was excluded from
challenge?
The proposed regulations had indeed narrowed the allowable
subject matter of comments. The proposed rule stated: "The Regional
Administrator shall provide thirty days for comments to be submitted
on the Tribal application. Comments shall be limited to the Tribe's assertion
of authority.""8 This rule is a pared down way for the EPA to say that it
233. Id.
234. When alerting the state of a tribe's TAS application, the EPA provides notice to
"the most appropriate State contacts which may include, for example, the Governor,
Attorney General, or the appropriate environmental agency head." Id. This is
certainly a more reliable and targeted type of notice than the mere publication notice
which the EPA will "make an effort" to provide for local governments.
235. From a practical standpoint, it seems that it would be administratively more
burdensome to identify the appropriate local newspapers and manage the logistics of
proper publication notice than it would be to simply send a single form notice to the
appropriate local government contact in the first instance.
236. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,884.
237. Id
238. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,108 (proposed Sept. 22,
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intended only to consider comments that addressed the third criterion
needed for TAS designation. As described above, the third criterion
concerns the question of whether the waters in which the tribe sought
to regulate are within the borders and "held" by the tribe either
directly or indirectly.2 9 The answer to this question turns on whether
the tribe has inherent authority over the waters for which it seeks to
administer water quality standards, thus invoking the EPA's use of the
second Montana exception. 4 ' Consequently, the proposed EPA rule
only allowed comments on whether a tribe applying for TAS
designation actually had inherent authority over the waters it sought to
regulate.
This proposed rule did not sit well with governmental entities that
were prospective challengers to TAS applications. In their comments
to the proposed rule, they claimed that it was "unlawful to limit public
comment to just the Tribal demonstration of authority [and that the
regulations] should allow public review of all four statutory criteria. " ",
The EPA rejected this assertion. The Agency reasoned that the CWA
does not require the EPA to provide notice and comment on TAS
applications to begin with; therefore, if the Agency chose to accept
comments at all it was within its discretion what subjects would receive
consideration. But why did the EPA pick the third criterion-the
tribe's assertion of authority over the waters? The Agency's answer was
that it believed that it did not need any outside input to accurately
decide the other TAS criteria.242 That is, the Agency was sufficiently
informed to determine whether the tribe is federally recognized, is a
governing body carrying out governmental powers, and is capable of
administering an effective water quality standards program. Accepting
comments on these criteria, according the EPA, would unnecessarily
complicate and delay the TAS application process. 43
In contrast, the "EPA believes that providing for comment on the
authority criterion is appropriate because this is the only criterion
which outside comments might help to address.", 44 Implicit in this
belief is the Agency's concession that it may not have access to, or have
the wherewithal to locate, all of the pertinent information concerning
a tribe's asserted inherent authority. Another reason may be that the
"authority criterion" may be the one criterion that the commenting
1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (emphasis added).
239. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a) (3) (2001).
240. The reason for this, as explained above, is that the EPA had interpreted section
518(e) to not be an express grant of regulatory authority over all reservation waters
(despite the "or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation" language in the
statute).
Under Montana, without an express delegation, tribal regulation of
reservation waters would only be granted if tribes could demonstrate inherent
authority over the waters.
241. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,884 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.RI pt. 131).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id,
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governmental entities are in the best position to challenge. That is,
unlike the other TAS criteria, other states may oppose tribal authority
over certain waters because it believes that the subject waters are
actually "held" by the state and could not be the subject of a tribe's
inherent authority. A state may be asserting authority over the same
waters that a tribe wants to regulate; this factor makes the "authority
criterion" unique.
In the end, the EPA adopted its proposed rule. In doing so, the
EPA significantly limited the number of comments that it would have
The final
to contend with when processing a TAS application.
regulations limit comments from appropriate government entities
about a TAS application to a tribe's assertion of authority."' Only
states, tribes, and other federal entities located contiguous to the
applicant's reservation are allowed to comment on a tribe's request for
TAS designation. The limitations incorporated in this rule appear to
tip the decisional scale in favor of Indian tribes receiving TAS status, a
viewpoint that becomes a major point of contention in Wisconsin v.
EPA.
One may argue that not only does the EPA start with the
presumption that an applicant tribe will have inherent authority over
reservation waters, but also, that such a presumption is practically
The strict
irrebuttable by a challenging governmental entity.
limitations placed on the notice and comment opportunities, the
EPA's generalized findings supporting tribal inherent authority, the
EPA's finding of congressional policy favoring tribal regulation of
water quality, and the EPA's express statements espousing a preference
for delegation of authority to tribes all buttress the position that
challenges to a TAS application by appropriate governmental entities
will be futile. Of course, the response to this contention is that the
entire notice and comment procedure for TAS applications is not
statutorily required in the first instance, and the EPA is in fact being
generous by allowing it. It would thus follow that there is no basis to
complain about the restrictive nature of the comment process or the
presumptive position in favor of tribal authority.
Is the opportunity to comment on tribal authority over particular
water resources nothing but an illusory mechanism with a foregone
conclusion? Is there any objectivity in the analysis of a tribe's asserted
authority over reservation waters? Are there effective legal challenges
an "appropriate governmental entity" can make in opposition to a
tribe's TAS designation? These questions, as well as the numerous
other issues discussed so far in this article, arise in the important case
of Wisconsin v. EPA.

245.

40 C.F.R- § 131.8(c) (2001).
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IV. WHEN THE GOVERNMENTAL ENTIT'IS CHALLENGE TO
"TREATMENT AS A STATE" DESIGNATION HAS FAILED - MAY
IT PLEASE THE COURT: WISCONSIN V. EPA
When the EPA grants or denies treatment as a state status to a
tribe, it is not necessarily the end of the line for the tribe or the
governmental entities challenging the tribe's authority. The EPA is,
after all, a federal administrative agency whose decisions are subject to
judicial review by the federal courts. Because of the ease with which a
tribe may demonstrate inherent authority over reservation waters and
the EPA's proclivity to grant TAS status, the most likely factual scenario
for judicial review is where a governmental entity is seeking review of a
TAS designation. Such a situation played out recently when the state
of Wisconsin sought judicial review of the EPA's decision to grant TAS
status to the Sokaogon Chippewa Community Indian Tribe for
purposes of setting water quality standards under section 303 and
certifying compliance with those standards under section 401. In
Wisconsin v. EPA, 46 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
rejected Wisconsin's opposition to the TAS designation, thus
establishing a high threshold for a governmental entity to successfully
challenge a grant of TAS status.
A. BACK ON THEIR HEELS: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF TAS

DECISIONS

It is especially important for purposes of this article to pay
attention to the standard of review used by a federal court in reviewing
a TAS designation. While the standard ofjudicial review is perhaps a
mundane subject needing only quick mentioning in other contexts,
the instant case demonstrates the application of review standards and
attendant difficulties encountered by governmental entities opposing
tribal authority status.
The well-settled rule is that a federal court will grant an agency
substantial deference when reviewing its decisions. The Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA) 2 47 dictates that when an administrative agency
is interpreting an agency-administered statute as applied to a
particular set of circumstances, the reviewing court may only set aside
the agency action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.", 4 This standard applies
when a court is reviewing agency fact-finding and, as applied, is very
deferential.249
Furthermore, the long-standing test fashioned by the Supreme
Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council" supports
upholding agency interpretations of statutes they administer. In
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
Id. § 706(2) (a).
CAE, Inc. v. Clear Air Eng'g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Chevron, the Court held that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."25 Following this standard, when a lawsuit is brought by a
governmental entity challenging the EPA's finding of tribal authority
over the reservation waters, the first step is to look at the CWA itself.
Section 518 of the CWA does not address what standards to apply in
order to ascertain whether a tribe has authority over reservation
waters. That is, the statute does not explain how to determine if the
waters are "held" directly or indirectly by the tribe, how to administer
the application process, or what competing claims of authority over
the subject waters may trump a tribe's claim. However, section 518 is
not completely silent; it expressly directs the EPA to "promulgate final
regulations which specify how Indian tribes shall be treated as States
for purposes of this chapter." 25 ' The TAS regulations promulgated by
the EPA are also "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."253
Finally, not only will the promulgated regulations specifying the
TAS designation procedure receive a "light touch review," but the
actual decisions the EPA makes in applying those regulations will also
receive substantial deference. The Supreme Court reiterated this
viewpoint recently when it stated: "[w] e have recognized a very good
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulingsfor which deference is
claimed."24 Thus, the EPA's decision (arising from its promulgated
regulations) whether or not to grant a tribe TAS status to administer
water quality standards will also receive substantial deference.

251. Id. at 843.
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(3).
253. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.
Id. In Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit rejected a
facial challenge to TAS regulations. The court in Montana found that the EPA is not
entitled to deference concerning the scope of tribal authority because it is a question of
law, it has nothing to do with the EPA's expertise, and it was not a subject specifilcally
committed to the EPA's regulation. Notwithstanding this heightened level of review,
the court held the EPA had not "committed any material mistakes of law in its
delineation of the scope of inherent tribal authority." Id. at 1140.
254. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (emphasis added); see
also Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2001).
[T]he EPA here has interpreted the statute by promulgating formal
regulations, using plenary notice-and-comment procedures, and then
implementing its rule with respect to the Band through a formal process in
which the State was entitled to be heard. Its regulationsand subsequent decision
are therefore entitled to deference under Mead and Chevron. (emphasis
added).
Id. at 746.
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The ultimate result combines the APA's standard of review for
agency factfinding with Chevron's deference to an agency's
promulgation and application of congressionally mandated
regulations. Accordingly, when a governmental entity fails to convince
the EPA that a tribe does not have the requisite authority for TAS
status, the government must challenge the EPA's decision under the
arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law
standard.25 5 This deferential standard makes challenging the grant of
TAS status in the courts exceedingly difficult.
B. FACTS
Judge Wood's opinion explained the backdrop of Wisconsin v. EPA
very clearly and, for that reason, this article shall generally restate the
court's

articulation

of the

facts 56

(with

some

supplementary

information from the parties' briefs and other materials).
The
Sokaogon Chippewa Community is an Indian tribe located in
northeastern Wisconsin on an 1,850 acre reservation. The tribe is also
known as the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and
thus is referred to by the court as "the Band." 57 There are three lakes
on or adjacent to the Band's reservation: Mole Lake, Bishop Lake, and
Rice Lake. Rice Lake, which lies at the headwaters of the Wolf River,
is the largest waterbody on the reservation and is one of the last
remaining ancient wild rice beds in the state of Wisconsin.259 The wild
rice serves as a significant dietary, economic, and cultural resource for
the Band. Each year in early autumn, the Band holds the traditional
rice harvest on Rice Lake in the same manner as they have done for
many years.2 6 The harvest is a significant part of the Band's heritage. 6'
Furthermore, the Band is generally reliant on all of its reservation
water resources for food, fresh water, medicines, and raw materials.6 2
A unique characteristic of the Mole Lake reservation is that all of
the land within the reservation is held by the United States in trust for
the tribe; none of the land is owned in fee by non-members of the
tribe. This fact obviates many of the legal and policy intricacies of the
Montana test because there is no concern about regulating activity by
non-members of the tribe on fee lands within the reservation.
In August of 1994, the Band applied for TAS status to administer
water quality standards for reservation waters. 263 Pursuant to TAS

255. Conversely, this standard would apply equally where a tribe challenges the
EPA's denial of TAS designation.
256. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 744-45.

257. Id. at 745.
258. Great Lakes Intertribal Council, Sokaogon (Mole Lake) Band of Chippewa Indians,

at http://www.glitc.org/mlchip.htm.
259. Id
260. Wild Rice Harvest, Article by Olive Glasgo, at http://www.molelake.com/.

261. Id.
262. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
263. Id.
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application processing regulations, the EPA notified Wisconsin of the
Band's TAS application submission. The EPA invited comment from
Wisconsin concerning the Band's assertion of authority over
reservation waters and any competing claim of jurisdiction the state
may have. "Wisconsin opposed the application, arguing that it was
sovereign over all of the navigable waters in the state, including those
on the reservation, and that its sovereignty precluded any tribal
regulation."2 " Specifically, Wisconsin sent two letters to the EPA
claiming that the Equal Footing Doctrine reserved all navigable waters
and land under them to the people of the states, and that the creation
of the Mole Lake reservation ninety-one years after Wisconsin was
admitted to the Union did not divest the state of its authority over
those waters. 65 Wisconsin emphasized that the EPA interpreted
section 518(e) of the CWA as intending only to recognize authority
the tribe already possessed; not to grant any new authority.2
Wisconsin argued that under the Equal Footing Doctrine the state
possessed sovereignty over reservation waters long before the Mole
Lake reservation was even created; therefore any grant of authority to
the Band over such waters would extend new authority to the Band
rather than simply recognize preexistingjurisdiction.
After extensive administrative hearings, the EPA granted TAS
status to the Band for section 303 and 401 purposes. The EPA
determined the Band met all four TAS criteria including
demonstration of inherent authority over all of the reservation waters.
In granting TAS status to the Band, the EPA dismissed Wisconsin's
Equal Footing Doctrine argument primarily for two reasons. First,
Wisconsin's reading of the doctrine as giving the state absolute
authority over the waters overlying the submerged beds was overbroad.
That is, even if the state has title to the shores and submerged beds of
reservation waters, such rights do not trump the federal government's
constitutional authority to regulate the navigable waters of the United
States. Second, neither the Equal Footing Doctrine nor title to
lakebeds is mentioned in section 518 of the CWA. Congress did not
limit TAS designation to those tribes who owned submerged lands
within their reservations. According to the EPA, inherent authority
over reservation waters does not turn on who holds title to land
underlying the waters. Consequently the Band received TAS status
despite Wisconsin's objections to the application.
This plot, of course, is not without all the essential characters of a
classic environmental melodrama. Upstream from Rice Lake on the
Wolf River was a large, nearly completed, privately owned, zinc-copper
sulfide mine. 261 Mines create substantial point source discharges
264. 1&
265. Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001)
(No. 99-2618).
266. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
267. In the court's opinion,Judge Wood characterized the Band's TAS designation
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containing various pollutants that mandate NPDES permits.2'6 In
addition, "[a]lthough mining permits are issued by various State
agencies, the Office of Water may review State issued permits to ensure
compliance with water quality criteria and ensure that effluent
guidelines for ore/coal mining and processing are properly applied to
wastewater discharges from these activities."269 Now the picture
becomes clear; if the Band received TAS status, it would likely set water
quality standards stringent enough to proscribe some or all of the
discharge from the upstream mine. Without being able to discharge
certain amounts into the river, the operation of the mine may be
severely limited or completely prohibited.
On January 25, 1996, Wisconsin filed an action with the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking revocation of the
EPA's grant of TAS status to the Band. On April 28, 1999, the district
court upheld the TAS designation on summary judgment. The court
found that the EPA reasonably interpreted its regulations when it
determined that a tribe could regulate all water within a reservation
regardless of who owned the submerged lands. Two months later
Wisconsin filed a notice of appeal and the Band intervened as a
defendant, filing a brief in support of TAS designation.
Oral
argument commenced on November 6, 2000 before a panel of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Diane Wood,
Ann Williams, and Michael Kanne. More than ten months after oral
argument, in late September of 2001,"' Judge Wood issued a
unanimous opinion.
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
At the outset of its opinion, the court of appeals pointed out that
this case was ripe for adjudication. It did not matter that the Band had
not yet promulgated specific water quality standards resulting in any
sort of restriction on an upstream discharge or to an ongoing project.
Wisconsin's real challenge, the court explained, was the grant of TAS
status to the Band. By granting TAS status, the EPA effectively created
a state-like entity within the borders of Wisconsin. 7' If the court found
as "an action with the potential to throw a wrench into the state's planned
construction of... [the] mine." Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745. In its Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc of the Seventh Circuit Panel's
decision, Wisconsin characterized judge Wood's statement as a "glaring factual error."
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 13-14, Wisconsin v.
EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-2618). Wisconsin sought to clarify that a
private company, not the state, was planning and constructing the mine. However,
even if true, this fact does not necessarily negate the state's likely concern over the
potentially stifling effect of the Band's water quality standards on economic
development upstream from the reservation (including the mine in question).
268. See generally EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, Mining, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/indpermitting/mining.cfm?program-id=14
(last
modified Nov. 26, 2001).
269. I&
270. This delay perhaps reflected the intricacies of the issues involved in this case.
271. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
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this action improvident, there was a present injury caused by the EPA
that the court had the power to remedy.
Turning to the substantive analysis, the court noted that
"Wisconsin is challenging the EPA's findings only with respect to the
third requirement for TAS status-the demonstration of the tribe's
inherent authority to regulate water quality within the borders of the
reservation."2 " The court was merely highlighting that the state was
renewing challenges it was permitted to make during the notice and
This raises the interesting question of whether,
comment period.
despite the state's inability to submit comments on other TAS criteria,
it could seek judicial review of conclusions pertaining to those criteria,
e.g., a tribe's capability to administer a water quality standards
program. In this case, however, the sole focus was on the EPA's
finding that the Band sufficiently demonstrated inherent authority
over the waters it sought to regulate.
1. Not "Within the Borders"
The court quickly rejected Wisconsin's argument that Rice Lake
was not within the borders of the Mole Lake Reservation. The
argument was never presented to the district court and was not made
to the EPA during the comment period; as a result, it was waived. 5
For good measure, the court noted that even if it were to consider the
argument, it would be of no merit. "Rice Lake is almost completely
surrounded by reservation land (and the small percentage that is not
abuts off-reservation trust lands)."276 In these circumstances, the EPA
could reasonably conclude that Rice Lake was sufficiently within the
27
Thus, while the argument was technically
reservation's bordersY.
waived by Wisconsin, the court took the opportunity to make a
significant statement concerning the geographic scope of waters that
may fall within the purview of tribal regulation. It is conceivable that
in the future, a tribe involved in similar litigation would cite to the
court's judicial dictum.7

272. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
273. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 746.
274. Id. at 745.
275. Id at 746.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. SeeAlloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222,,1225 n.5 (7th Cir.
1980) (discussingjudicial dictum); see also Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993)
The term 'dictum' is generally used as an abbreviation of obiter dictum, which
means a remark or opinion uttered by the way. Such an expression or
opinion as a general rule is not binding as authority or precedent within the
stare decisis rule. On the other hand, an expression of opinion upon a point
in a case argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon by the court,
though not essential to the disposition of the cause, if dictum, is a judicial
dictum. And further, ajudicial dictum is entitled to much weight, and should
be followed unless found to be erroneous (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 717.
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2. The Equal Footing Doctrine
The court next addressed Wisconsin's renewal of its argument that
the tribe simply could not have authority over reservation waters
because the state had title to reservation waters and lands submerged
beneath those waters pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine. The
Equal Footing Doctrine took shape in Pollard v. Hagan2" where the
United States Supreme Court held that a state receives absolute title to
the beds of navigable waterways within its boundaries upon admission
to the Union.2 0 The general premise flowing from the Equal Footing
Doctrine is that newly admitted states have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction over their lands as the original thirteen
states.
Since the original states had title to the submerged lands
within their borders, then so must the states subsequently admitted to
the Union. 22 Thus, in Pollard"the Court established the absolute title
of the States to the beds of navigable waters, a title which neither a
provision in the Act admitting the State to the Union nor a grant from
Congress to a third party was capable of defeating.283

Ownership of the submerged lands, however, does not result in a
state's absolute right to regulate the overlying waters. In Montana v.
United States, the Court explained:
[T]he ownership of land under navigable waters is an incident of
sovereignty. As a general principle, the Federal Government holds
such lands in trust for future States, to be granted to such States when
they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an "equal footing"
with the established States. After a State enters the Union, title to the
land is governed by state law. The State's power over the beds of navigable
waters remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power of the
United Sttes to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign
commerce.

Thus, the federal government retains a dominant navigable servitude
to regulate waters of the country under the Commerce Clause." 5 The
tension becomes apparent, as Wisconsin is sovereign over the land on
which the water in the state sits, while the overlying water is always
subject to the extensive power of the Commerce Clause.8 6 The CWA

279.
280.

44 U.S. 212 (1845).
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374

(1977).
281. Pollard,44 U.S. at 230.
282. Id. at 229.
283. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 374; see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283-85 (1997).
284. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
285. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) ("The power of Congress [under
the Commerce Clause], then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State
in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with
'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian
tribes'.").
286. See United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
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itself is an example of the federal government asserting its Commerce
Clause authority over the quality of navigable waters throughout the
nation. 287 Only through federal delegation, strictly overseen, may a
state administer its own programs under the CWA. Indeed, even in
one of the savings clauses of the CWA, Congress chose its words very
carefully in specifying what water rights states reserve under the Act:
"[i]t is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superceded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter.""'
The Equal Footing Doctrine argument Wisconsin put forth is not
cleanly disposed of by reference to a single case or statute.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals convincingly rejected the argument.
The court started its analysis by assuming Wisconsin did in fact have
title to the beds of water within the reservation. The court next
addressed the case of Wisconsin v. Baker,"9 which Wisconsin
continuously cited to in its briefs. In Baker, the Chippewa Indians
claimed that an 1854 treaty with the United States creating the tribe's
reservation in Wisconsin also gave the tribe the exclusive right to hunt
and fish in reservation waters.
As a result, the tribe contended, it
had the power to restrict public hunting and fishing in those lakes.
However, eight years prior to the treaty creating the reservation,
Wisconsin had been admitted to the Union on "equal footing" with
the original states.!" Therefore, it obtained title to all submerged
lands including those that eventually were encompassed within the
reservation boundaries.
In Baker, the court of appeals made two important findings. First,
the 1854 treaty was silent concerning any grant of exclusive hunting

[I]n determining whether Congress, in exercising its power under the
Commerce Clause, has acted within the bounds of its constitutional
authority, we must keep in mind that congressional power under the
Commerce Clause "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution."
Id. at 678 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).
287. See United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 348 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining
that the CWA is certainly a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause); Burnette v. Rowland, Nos. 3:94-CV-00420, 3:94-CV-00676, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11710, at *8 (D. Conn. May 4, 1998) ("Congress enacted RCRA and the CWA,
along with CERCLA, pursuant to the Commerce Clause.").
288. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1 (g) (1994) (emphasis added). Wisconsin also attempts to rely
on another savings clause in the CWA which declares that nothing in the Act shall be
"construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or.jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States." Id
§ 1370(2). Wisconsin contended that this provision reinforced that § 518(e) could not
be used to trump its preexisting title and control over reservation waters. This
argument does not further Wisconsin's position because it merely begs the question of
whether Wisconsin actually obtained title to and exclusive control over the reservation
waters pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine.
289. 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1983).
290. Id. at 1333.
291. Id,
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and fishing rights on reservation waters to the Chippewa Tribe.! 2
Second, the power to regulate fishing and hunting on navigable lakes
was one of the powers held by the original thirteen states incidental to
their ownership of the submerged lands;23 therefore, when Wisconsin
was admitted to the Union on "equal footing," it was vested with
regulatory power over hunting and fishing.24 The court determined
that the Equal Footing Doctrine gave Wisconsin both title to the
submerged lands in the state and the power to regulate hunting and
fishing on all of the state's navigable waters. Since the court found
that neither the 1854 treaty nor any other action by the United States
government clearly divested Wisconsin of its regulatory power over
hunting or fishing on navigable waters, the Chippewa Tribe could not
claim it had that same authority over reservation waters.
Judge Wood rejected Wisconsin's heavy reliance on Baker on three
grounds. First, Baker was decided before section 518(e) of the CWA
was enacted. "The legal structure governing Baker involved only the
treaty that created the reservation, and that treaty did not contain any
language regarding the tribe's power to regulate reservation waters.
In this case, there exists section 518(e) of the CWA that allows a
delegation of authority to Indian tribes over reservation waters when
specific statutory and regulatory criteria are satisfied. 96 Additionally,
there is nothing in section 518(e) that limits such TAS grants only to
those tribes with title to the submerged lands of reservation waters.
Second, unlike the Band in this case, the Chippewa Tribe in Baker
did "not contend that public fishing and hunting pose[d] an
imminent threat to the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the [tribe]." ' As a result, the court found
that not only did the Chippewa Tribe lack express authority to regulate
reservation waters under the treaty, but also it did not make a claim
that it had inherent authority under the second Montana exception.
More importantly, to Judge Wood, the Baker court's line of reasoning
indicated that the court "left open the possibility that state ownership
of lake beds may not preclude tribal authority over the waters if tribal
regulation was necessary to protect the 'political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare' of the Band." s Thus,
contrary to Wisconsin's arguments, the Baker decision did not
foreclose the possibility of a tribe obtaining regulatory authority over
reservation waters even where the reservation was created subsequent
to the state acquiring title to the submerged lands. 99
292. Id. at 1333-34.
293. Id.; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 550-51 n.1 (1981).
294. Baker, 698 F.2d at 1333-34.
295. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2001).
296. Id.
297. Baker, 698 F.2d at 1335 (internal quotations omitted).
298. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
299. Wisconsin makes too much out of the Baker court's explanation that state
regulation of hunting and fishing on state waters arises from the state's title to the
submerged lands. Wisconsin asserts that such authority must mean that the state has
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Finally, the court of appeals rejected the application of Baker
because it concerned hunting and fishing rights, which traditionally
fall within the purview of state regulation.
In contrast, Wisconsin v.
EPA concerned water quality standards of navigable waters. Unlike
hunting and fishing rights, the federal government (i.e., the EPA), not
the state, regulates water quality.30 In fact, the state can only act in this
area when and how the federal government allows it. It is the
revocable delegation of authority by the EPA that enables Wisconsin to
set water quality standards for the state and to administer an NPDES
permit program.
After discrediting Baker as inapplicable to this case, the court went
on to describe "legal principles" that were applicable. According to the
court, these principles all "support the EPA's determination that a
state's title to a lake bed does not in itself exempt the waters from all
outside regulation." 3 Put another way, these concepts explain why
the Equal Footing Doctrine is not an obstacle to a tribe obtaining TAS
status.
The first concept is Congress's expansive power to regulate
navigable waters of the United States under the Commerce Clause as
discussed above. The court's strongest statement rejecting Wisconsin's
equal footing argument came when it pointed out that:
[Congress's Commerce Clause power over navigable waters] has not
been eroded in any way by the Equal Footing Doctrine cases, which
"involved only the shores of and lands beneath navigable waters.
[The doctrine] cannot be accepted as limiting the broad powers of
the United
States to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce
3 4

Clause."

There is simply no body of precedent that gives states unbridled
regulatory authority over the actual water that passes through or
overlays the submerged lands they own. 0 5 Despite Wisconsin's
references to case law, which make remarks that "navigable waters
uniquely implicate sovereign state interests," 0 6 it ignores what Judge
Wood ultimately finds controlling. Since Pollard,states have received
title to the waters and the exclusive right to control the use thereof. This is quite a
leap! In fact, it seems that authority to regulate hunting and fishing as an incident to
submerged land ownership is just that: the authority to regulate hunting and fishing.
300. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1994) (explaining procedure for EPA's
withdrawal of an EPA approved state NPDES program for noncompliance).
303. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
304. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963)).
305. States do manage appropriation and riparian water distribution systems. The
CWA contemplates that it can coexist with such systems. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (g).
306. Wisconsin's citation to Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 282-84 (1997)
does not promote its position. In fact the majority of the language from the opinion
that is cited explains that only the lands underlying navigable waters are "sovereign
lands." Simply because "navigable waters uniquely implicate [state] sovereign
interests" does not mean states receive title to the waters themselves. See generally id.
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both title and authority specifically over submerged lands and shores
within the state. This separation of underlying lands and shores from
the overlying water is intentional. The federal government's authority
over all navigable waters applied to the original thirteen states and
applies similarly to subsequently admitted states, such as Wisconsin,
through the Equal Footing Doctrine. Congress' broad Commerce
Clause power is not diminished by state ownership of submerged lands
and shores. Even the state's power over the beds of navigable waters
remains subject to "the paramount power of the United States to
ensure that30 7such waters remain free to interstate and foreign
commerce."
The United States' extensive authority over Indian tribes also
worked to convince the court. This authority is exclusive and comes
directly from the Constitution.3 8 In fact, the general rule is that state
laws may only be applied to Indians on their reservations if Congress
allows.30 ' For instance, in the case of the Mole Lake Band, the EPA,
not Wisconsin, administers the NPDES permit program for reservation
discharges in the absence of an approved tribal program."'
At the close of its analysis, the court points out that Wisconsin does
not deny that its ownership of submerged lands would not prevent the
federal government from regulating reservation waters and, thus,
"cannot now complain about the federal government allowing tribes to
do so. 1 1 While this argument initially sounds appealing, its brevity in
the opinion makes it unclear and subject to attack. There are two
problems with Judge Wood's statement. The first is that the CWA
allows a tribe to receive "Treatment as a state" status under the CWA,
not "Treatment as the Federal Government." There may be certain
actions within the authority of the federal government to perform that
would be constitutionally improper for a state to administer. For
instance, the federal government could require Wisconsin to stop a
project that might block a navigable waterway, but it is doubtful that it
could authorize California to direct Wisconsin to do the same. If the
federal government tried designating a similar federal duty to a TAS
tribe, it would be giving the tribe privileges beyond what any other
state could constitutionally obtain.
The second problem is that it gives the impression the court thinks
that section 518(e) is an express grant of authority to tribes over
reservation waters. Simply reasoning that if the federal government
has regulatory jurisdiction, it can delegate the same to a tribe ignores
the EPA's determination that section 518(e) was not an express
delegation of authority to tribes over reservation waters. During the
307. Montana, v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981).
308. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3; see also Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
309. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747 (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987)).
310. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, State and Tribal
ProgramIssues, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/issues.cfm?programjid=12
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992).
311. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
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rulemaking, the EPA determined section 518(e) of the CWA intended
only to recognize authority that the tribe already possessed; not to
grant any new authority."' Wisconsin argued that any grant of
authority to the Band over reservation waters would be extending new
authority to the Band rather than simply recognizing preexisting
jurisdiction. So, the issue is not whether the federal government can
simply let the tribe do what the federal government could; the issue
here is whether the tribe possessed inherent authority over the
reservation waters to begin with. Although, in the next section of its
opinion, the court recognized that the EPA does not consider section
518(e) an express grant of authority, the court's brief statement
concerning federal delegation could be construed as an internal
inconsistency in the opinion.
Read practically though, Judge Wood's statement simply calls
Wisconsin's bluff concerning the Equal Footing Doctrine. If tide to,
and exclusive control over the reservation waters truly passed to the
state under the Equal Footing Doctrine, regulation of the water would
even be beyond federal power."' But, Wisconsin admits the federal
government can regulate its waters (without any act of divestiture), and
therefore simultaneously admits that the power over overlying waters
could not have been part of the rights and powers granted to the states
under the Equal Footing Doctrine. Such regulation falls under the
Commerce Clause and exceeds the jurisdiction of the original thirteen
states. Accordingly, asserting title and control to overlying waters was
received (and) granted (or) vested at the time of statehood as a
defense to a tribe's inherent authority over reservation waters lacks
merit.
3. Inherent Authority Over Off-Reservation Activities
The court of appeals next dealt with Wisconsin's argument "that
the Band did not make the required showing of authority over those
activities potentially affected by its imposition of water quality
standards."315 Wisconsin argued the Band could not establish its
inherent authority over extraterritorial activity such as the upstream
mine, because Montana only applies to on-reservation activities of nonmembers. Wisconsin believed a tribe could only establish its inherent
authority by showing that impairment of the reservation's waters from
312. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(emphasis added) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
313. Wisconsin's argument is that title to the overlying waters was granted to the
state with the title to the submerged lands. If such title to the waters was of equivalent

quality to that of the submerged lands, Pollardand its progeny would dictate that a
state's title to the waters is "absolute" and neither a provision in the Act admitting the
state to the Union nor a grant from Congress to a third party (i.e., an Indian tribe) is
capable of defeating a state's title to the waters. See Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977).

314. See generally United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996).
315.

Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 748.
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on-reservation activitieswould affect the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
The court's responses to this position prove it unavailing. First and
foremost, Wisconsin ignored that Congress permits a tribe to receive
"Treatment as a State" status. Such designation gives a tribe all of the
rights and powers of a state for approved purposes under the CWA.
The holding in Arkansas v. Oklahoma and the EPA's regulations
instruct that upstream discharges must comply with downstream states'
water quality standards. The lesson of Albuquerque v. Browner is that a
TAS tribe is not a second-class sovereign but is treated as a full-fledged
state under the CWA. Accordingly, upstream extraterritorial activities
must comply with a downstream TAS tribe's water quality standards.
Thus, by enacting section 518(e), Congress created an express
statutory provision that allows TAS tribes the ability to regulate
reservation waters even if extraterritorial activities are affected.
Wisconsin's argument that the Band has not shown inherent
authority over extraterritorial activities (and it never could because its
authority only extends to non-members within reservation boundaries)
puts the cart before the horse. The Band sought to regulate the water
quality standards of the reservation, not the activity of the upstream
mine or any other facility. It is only after the Band shows it has
authority to regulate the reservation waters that its water quality
standards are imposed on upstream dischargers-not the other way
around. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is not relevant in considering
inherent authority in the first instance, but is simply a side effect
arising from the grant of TAS designation. In addition, "[t] here is no
case that expressly rejects an application of Montana to off-reservation
activities that have significant effects within the reservation."01 6 A TAS
applicant need only establish inherent authority over the regulation of
reservation waters by showing that: "(1) there are waters within the
reservation used by the tribe, (2) the waters and critical habitat are
subject to protection under the CWA, and (3) impairment of waters
would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and welfare
of the tribe.""' A tribe need not demonstrate authority over offreservationactivity to satisfy any of these elements.
Second, and further evidencing that off-reservation effects are
irrelevant in the TAS application stage, is that Congress mandated
establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism to work out
"unreasonable consequences" arising from different water quality
standards set by states and tribes on the same waterbody 8 The EPA
established such a system. It is hard to conceive why Congress
recognized this issue and required a transboundary dispute-solving
device it if did not anticipate that a TAS tribe's water quality standards
could restrict certain off-reservation activities.1 9
316. Id,at 749.
317. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).
318. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
319. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 749.

WISCONSIN V. EPA

Issue 2

Third, the court pointed out that a TAS tribe is still subservient to
the EPA's decisions concerning national water pollution control.
Under the CWA, a downstream TAS tribe's only recourse is to apply to
the EPA Administrator when it is unhappy with the allowance of an
upstream discharge; it cannot veto an upstream activity. 20 Indeed, it is
the EPA-not the tribe or the state-requiring upstream compliance
with downstream water standards.32 ' The EPA's regulations prohibit
issuance of permits that could cause downstream water quality
standard violations.2
The EPA could easily amend its regulations,
allow for variances, 23 or use the dispute resolution mechanism to allow
an upstream discharge that may otherwise violate downstream water
quality standards. The ultimate authority remains with the federal
government and a TAS tribe receives no more than any other
approved state under the CWA.
. Finally, an underlying difficulty with Wisconsin's stance from the
outset was that it "conceded that the waters within the Band's
reservation are very important to the Band's economic and physical
existence." 2 4 In the court's view, this concession turned Wisconsin's
argument into the following: "we acknowledge that the Band would
have inherent authority over reservation waters but for our title to and
control over the submerged lands and the overlying waters, and a
tribe's inability to regulate non-members outside the reservation."
Once the court refuted Wisconsin's two primary objections to inherent
authority, it was left with Wisconsin's admission that the impairment of
waters would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and
welfare of the tribe. Wisconsin should not be faulted for such a
position; a contrary argument would surely have been disingenuous.
V. IMPLICATIONS
There are 554 federally recognized Indian tribes in the United
States. 25 In the 1990 census, the federal government recognized 278
Indian land areas as reservations. 6 Some reservation areas include
significant acreage. For instance, "the Navajo Reservation consists of
some 16 million acres in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah."3 27 Such

320. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 100 (1992) (citing International Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1987)). A TAS tribe also may also submit
comments and recommendations to the permitting state and the EPA with respect to
any permit application being considered. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (5).
321. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 106.
322. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2001).
323. See supranote 117.
324. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 750.
325. EPA Office of Water, American
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numbers make clear that the widespread grant of TAS designation to
tribes to administer water quality standards could potentially have an
enormous impact on the functioning of the CWA throughout the
United States.
Furthermore, while reservation land is spread
throughout the country, the vast majority of reservations are
concentrated in the western states and Alaska.3 2 The western states are
historically where the most intense disputes have arisen over water
regulation due to the constant supply and demand problems
associated with the climate and topography3s
The patchwork of
reservation land in the West comes with the potential for a collage of
different water quality standards set by TAS tribes-a virtual guarantee
of transboundary conflicts. Thus, a whole new saga in the storied
water battles of the West may find a stage in section 518(e) of the
CWA. Of course, although perhaps more pronounced in the West,
transboundary conflicts may play out in any of the fifty states where
TAS tribes are located (e.g., Wisconsin). Complications that arise
from empowering more tribes with regulatory power under the CWA
are not hard to envision.
The implications of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Wisconsin v.
EPA concern the prelude to water quality conflicts between tribes and
states; the TAS designation process itself. That is, the court's opinion
helps set the tone concerning tribes' ability to obtain TAS status in the
first instance, thus enabling them to become sovereign players in the
CWA and assert their authority. Specifically, this article addresses two
likely implications of the Seventh Circuit's holding. First, more tribes
will apply for and receive TAS status to administer water quality
standards. And second, opposition by governmental entities to TAS
designation to administer water quality standards will be virtually
futile. These predictions are reviewed in more detail below.
A. "TREATMENT AS A STATE" DESIGNATIONS TO ADMINISTER WATER

QuALrrY STANDARDS WILL INCREASE

The threshold determinant of the potential ramifications of
section 518(e), and its accompanying regulations, is how many Indian
tribes are going to apply for and obtain TAS designation to set water
quality standards. Clearly, the easier it is for tribes to obtain TAS
status, the more likely it is that additional tribes will apply for such
designation.3 '
Indian tribes often have limited personnel and
328. "Four states (all in the West) have Indian populations of 100,000 or more:
Oklahoma, California, Arizona, and New Mexico. The six states where Native
Americans make up 5 percent or more of the total population are Alaska, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Montana, and Arizona." Id.
329. See generally Betsy Cody, Western Water Resource Issues, Congressional Research
Service Reports, at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRS/abstract.cfm?NLEid=16352.
330. Such logic is subject to the caveat that resource limitations faced by many tribes
may dissuade them from applying for TAS status irrespective of their anticipated
ability to obtain such designation. See supra text accompanying note 140. Conversely,
due to the extreme importance of water resources to many reservations, some tribes
may pursue TAS status no matter how difficult the fight or how high the costs.
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resources to deal with environmental matters""' and pursuing TAS
designation would seem more appealing when there are fewer
obstacles (i.e., less expenditure of resources) to its attainment.3 2 Thus
far, this article has described some of the ways it has been made easier
for tribes to show that hey have sufficient inherent authority over
reservation waters to receive TAS designation. In addition, this article
has discussed some of the obstacles facing a governmental entity in
opposing a tribe's assertion of authority during the TAS application
phase or when seeking judicial review of the EPA's grant of TAS
designation. In combination, these two observations appear to tip the
scale in favor of tribal regulatory authority despite competing claims of
jurisdiction from "appropriate governmental entities."
The state of Wisconsin would claim that this characterization is a
drastic understatement of the practical realities of the TAS designation
process. Although never addressed by the court of appeals' opinion,
Wisconsin had vehemently argued this point in its briefs. Wisconsin
pointedly asserted that the "TAS application process is designed to
lead to a predetermined result-the granting of tribal applications for
According to Wisconsin, the EPA's
treatment as a state."33
proclamation that it would examine each tribal claim of authority on a
"case-by-case basis" was nothing but lip service, and upon application
by a tribe for TAS status, a finding of tribal authority over reservation
waters was a forgone conclusion.
331. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Tribal
Handbook,
at
Environmental
and
Natural
Resource
Assistance
http://www.epa.gov/indian/tribhand.htm.
Many tribes have limited environmental staffs that are faced with the
challenge of addressing a broad range of environmental issues. Unlike state
environmental programs that have received annual federal funding for many
years, Tribal environmental programs generally must compete annually for
their funds.... Therefore, Tribal environmental staffs spend a large part of
their time applying for grants and searching for sources of federal assistance.
Id.
332. In addition, population trends and industrial development may make it more
important than ever for a tribe to assert control over its water resources. The EPA
notes that population studies indicate Indians are not shifting away from reservation
areas, Indian populations are growing, and more than half of tribal lands now have at
least as many non-Indians as Indians residing there. The Agency observed:
There are two interesting implications of this information for environmental
management purposes. First, Native Americans are not leaving their
homelands and, in fact, there is a likelihood that these communities will
develop to accommodate their increasing numbers. Second, many Native
American communities perceive that they have been and are being
encroached upon by the larger non-Native American populations.
fore to
Environmental management will be needed more than ever
minimize environmental impacts as populations grow. Also, Native American
environmental management systems will need to be innovative and creative
in accommodating the needs of their Native American and non-Native
American populations.
EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide,
Americans,
available
at
Chapter
One:
Understanding
Native
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chapl.htm.
333. Brief for Appellant at 10, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No.
99-2618).
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Specifically, Wisconsin was troubled by the lack of an honest
appraisal by the EPA of a tribe's claim ofjurisdiction over reservation
waters. Remember, for a tribe to satisfy the second Montana exception
(i.e., inherent authority) an application for TAS status "will need to
make a relatively simple showing of facts" 33 4 asserting that: (1) there
are waters within the reservation used by the tribe; (2) the waters and
critical habitat are subject to CWA protection; and (3) impairment of
waters would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and
welfare of the tribe. 5 Once the tribe meets this initial burden, the
EPA will presume, in light of facts presented in the TAS application
supplemented by the Agency's generalized findings regarding the
relationship of water quality to tribal health and welfare, that there has
been an actual showing of tribal jurisdiction and thus, authority to set
water quality standards. '
According to Wisconsin, this test "create[s] an insurmountable
presumption that tribes should obtain TAS status" 37 and is a "test for
inherent tribal authority that no tribe can fail."38 The indignation
underlying Wisconsin's assertions stems from what it believes to be the
EPA's total disregard of competing claims of jurisdiction over
reservation waters despite the Agency's policy "on paper" to seek out
and consider input on the subject. In Wisconsin's view, the test
implemented by the EPA belies any Agency intent to consider
competing claims ofjurisdiction. The only way a state could overcome
the EPA's presumption of tribal inherent authority would be to show
"that a reservation contains no water that is used by tribal members."3 9
Such a showing would be virtually impossible for a state to make.
It seems that Wisconsin's observations are not completely
unfounded hyperbole.
A careful reading of TAS regulations,
rulemaking proceedings, and EPA policy statements expressed in
various administrative publications support the position that
everything will be done to ensure an applicant tribe will receive TAS
status. Primarily, as discussed above, the EPA starts with the
presumption a that tribe will have inherent authority over reservation
waters. The Agency has assembled a collection of conclusions which,
despite being innocuously labeled as "generalized findings," are in fact
virtual proclamations that tribes will always possess authority to
regulate reservation waters. The EPA attempts to mitigate the impact
of the generalized findings' determinative quality by stating that the
findings will simply supplement a tribe's factual showing in its TAS
application. However, in the same breath, the Agency admits a
334. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Brief for Appellant at 16, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No.
99-2618).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 40.
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sufficient showing of facts will be "relatively simple." 4 ' With the
question of TAS authorization turning on whether a tribe has inherent
authority over the reservation waters, how can the EPA's standards
lead to any result but a grant of TAS designation?
Tribes that desire to chart the destiny of their water resources have
a helping hand in the EPA because the Agency has an institutional
predilection for tribal administration of water quality standards. More
tribes will apply for TAS status because its bestowment by the EPA is
virtually guaranteed. For those incredulous as to the existence of such
a policy, one need only read the EPA's own words:
Qualifying for administration of the water quality standards program
is optional for Indian Tribes and there is no time frame limiting

when such application can be made. As a general policy, EPA will not
deny a tribalapplication. Rather than formally deny the tribe's request,
EPA will continue to work cooperatively with the tribe in a continuing
effort to resolve deficiencies in the application or the tribal program
so that tribal authorization may occur. EPA also concurs with the view

that the intent of Congress and the EPA Indian Policy is to support
tribal govrnments in
programs.3

assuming authority to manage various water

Such policy statements send a clear signal to both tribes and interested
governmental entities that when a tribe submits a TAS application to
administer water quality standards, the EPA is hardly a neutral
decision-maker weighing the application against any competing claims
of jurisdiction.342 Instead, the Agency's institutional predisposition is
340. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879.
341. EPA Water Quality Standards Branch, Water Quality StandardsHandbook Second
at
1994),
available
&
Update
Aug.
(Sept.
1993
Edition
(emphasis
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/library/wqstandards/handbook.pdf
added); see also Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain
to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,884 ("the provision allowing
appropriate governmental entities to comment on tribal assertions of authority is not
intended as a barrier to Tribal program assumption."); see id. at 64,881 ("the Agency
presumes that, in general, Tribes are likely to possess the authority to regulate
activities affecting water quality on the reservation."); see id. at 64,888 ("Although EPA
believes that tribes should be provided every opportunity to regulate water quality and to
participate in environmental control programs, during dispute resolution actions the
appointed mediator/arbitrator will act first and foremost as a neutral facilitator of
discussions between parties.") (emphasis added); see id. at 64,879 (A tribal application
for TAS status "will need to make a relatively simple showing of facts.").
342. In an effort to drive home its claim of EPA "bias" in the TAS designation
process, Wisconsin explained that EPA officials had gone so far as to engage in
criminal conduct to defeat Wisconsin's competing claims ofjurisdiction over waters of
other reservations in the state. When Wisconsin v. EPA was initially filed in the district
court, it was consolidated with four other cases where Wisconsin was challenging the
EPA's decisions granting TAS status to two additional tribes: the Menominee and
Oneida. During the discovery phase of the consolidated cases, evidence surfaced that
EPA officials had backdated EPA documents pertaining to the TAS applications of the
Menominee and Oneida tribes and then falsely testified on multiple occasions about
having done so. This was done by the EPA officials, Wisconsin explains, to "bolster the
administrative records and thereby defeat Wisconsin's claim of sovereignty over waters
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to encourage tribal applications for TAS status, and, once received,
make sure they are approved.
So it would seem that applying for TAS status to administer water
quality standards would be an efficient use of limited tribal resources
allocated for environmental protection. Water is traditionally one of
the most important environmental aspects of Indian reservations and
an integral part of many tribes' heritage. Therefore, reservation water
quality likely ranks high on the environmental priority list of many
tribes. 43 The EPA has made the path to obtaining TAS designation for
administering water quality standards one of little resistance; or
perhaps more accurately, one where a tribe will be assisted until it
reaches its destination.
As verified by the Seventh Circuit in
within Wisconsin's Indian reservations." Brief for Appellant at 3-4, 13, 16-18,
Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-2618).
Consequently, a federal grand jury indicted Marc Radell, an Associate Regional
Counsel of the EPA, and ClaudiaJohnson, the Region V Tribal Coordinator/Program
Manager. Ms. Johnson died before the disposition of the case against her. However,
Mr. Radell pleaded guilty to contempt of court for his actions and admitted the factual
analyses in the records of the Oneida, Menominee, and Lac du Flambeau (another
TAS tribe) cases did not exist at the time of the TAS decisions. He also admitted that
he had filed false affidavits and had testified falsely at his deposition to conceal the
fabrication of the administrative record. Id.
As a result, the EPA withdrew previously granted TAS designations to the Oneida and
Lac du Flambeau tribes and the Menominee tribe voluntarily relinquished its TAS
status. The Mole Lake Band's application was not affected, however, because "there
was no similar factual findings document in the record of the Band's application."
Without evidence of wrongdoing pertaining specifically to the Band, the original TAS
designation remained in effect and the case proceeded. Id. at 13.
This chain of events certainly legitimizes suspicions that, in practice, the EPA's
process for determining whether a tribe has inherent authority over reservation waters
means nothing; approval of a TAS application is inevitable. After all, why would
government employees, including an attorney, with seemingly no personal interest at
stake conduct such malfeasance? Wisconsin reasonably argues it is a result of the
EPA's institutional bias in favor of granting TAS applications under all circumstances.
However, while such arguments are extremely interesting and intuitively reasonable,
they are only cf peripheral relevance to the situation in Wisconsin v. EPA. Wisconsin
apparently does not dispute the finding that there was no misconduct with respect to
the Band's application. To impute a type of "character evidence" from the
malfeasance involved with a few tribal applications to the entire application and
designation process (including the Band's application) would be legally dubious. The
court of appeals did not even address these matters in its opinion.
343. See,
e.g.,
Mni
Sose
Intertribal
Water
Rights
Coalition,
at
http://www.mnisose.org. The EPA's American Indian Environmental Office also
helps tribal environmental managers make decisions on environmental priorities for
the reservation and provides for EPA implementation assistance for environmental
programs. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Mission &
EPA Contacts, availableat http://www.epa.gov/indian/miss.htm.
344. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource
Guide, Chapter Three: EPA's Approach to Environmental Protection in Indian Country, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chap3.htm
[T]he Agency will recognize tribal governments as the primary parties for
setting standards, making environmental policy decisions, and managing
programs for reservations, consistent with Agency standards and regulations;
and as impediments in ourprocedures, regulations,or statutes are identified that limit
our ability to work effectively with tribes consistent with this Policy, we will seek to
remove those impediments. (emphasis added).
Id. The mission of the American Indian Environmental Office within the EPA's Office
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Wisconsin v. EPA, a tribe need not be concerned that its efforts in
obtaining TAS status will be for naught because extreme deference will
be afforded the EPA in any judicial review of its decision.
B. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY CHALLENGES TO "TREATMENT AS A STATE"
DESIGNATION: A FUTILE EXERCISE?

If more tribes apply for and receive TAS designation to administer
water quality standards, then there may be a proportionate number of
competing claims of jurisdiction over reservation waters by
governmental entities. By this point, it should be clear that this article
forecasts that opposition to tribal TAS applications will be futile.
Three main points can be deduced from Wisconsin v. EPA: EPA
approval of a TAS application is virtually guaranteed, courts will defer
to Agency discretion, and almost all conceivable legal challenges by an
"appropriate governmental agency" have been foreclosed.
The court of appeals, however, attempted to leave a glimmer of
hope for other legitimate and successful challenges to TAS
designation. In its conclusion, the court stated:
We have no occasion to say whether, on a different set of facts, the
EPA might extend the notion of a tribe's "inherent authority" to

affect off-reservation activities so far as to go beyond the standards of
the statute or the reulations. If it ever arises, that will be another
case, for another day.
It is, however, extremely difficult to envision the "day" and the "case"
to which the court alludes. If the court was referring to an egregious
hypothetical situation where the EPA is allowing a tribe to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over an activity completely unrelated to
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe,
then, of course, the court could halt such a warped application of the
Montana test. But, in the more pragmatic context of TAS designation
to tribes for section 303 and 401 purposes, the Seventh Circuit has
foiled realistic challenges by governmental entities to the EPA's
decisions. The court not only gave substantial deference to EPA
determinations, but, more importantly, squarely and convincingly
rejected what may have been the only viable legal arguments for
contesting a TAS designation to administer water quality standards.
A brief reflection on the arguments presented by Wisconsin and
rejected by the court is in order. First, Wisconsin argued that Rice
Lake was not within the borders of the Band's reservation
boundaries.3 6 Although this argument was waived, the court still
of Water is to coordinate the "Agency-wide effort to strengthen public health and
environmental protection in Indian Country, with a special emphasis on building Tribal
capacity to administer their own environmental programs." EPA Office of Water,
American
Indian Environmental
Office, Mission & EPA Contacts, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/miss.htm (emphasis added).
345. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001).
346. Id. at 746.
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spoke to it and decided that the EPA could reasonably conclude that
Rice Lake was sufficiently within the reservation's borders. 4 7 Second,
the court repudiated Wisconsin's claim that the Equal Footing
Doctrine vested the state with title to and exclusive control over
submerged lands and overlying waters within the reservation's borders
well before the reservation was created. 48 Wisconsin argued that its
title made it impossible for the Band to have inherent authority over
the reservation waters because the EPA construed section 518(e) as
only recognizing preexisting authority of tribes and Wisconsin was
admitted to the Union before creation of the reservation. This legal
argument is complicated and troubling until it is understood that the
Equal Footing Doctrine concerns only the "shores of and lands
beneath navigable waters""4 9 and in no way limits "the broad powers of
the United States to regulate the navigable waters under the
Commerce Clause."3 0 That is, the court rejected the assertion that a
state receives title to overlying waters under the Equal Footing Doctrine.
The court also refuted Wisconsin's contention that the Band could
only establish its inherent authority over reservation waters by showing
that impairment of waters from on-reservation activities would affect the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
In rejecting this somewhat backwards argument, the court of appeals
recognized that extraterritorial jurisdiction is not relevant in
considering a tribe's inherent authority over reservation waters in the
first instance, but is only a side effect arising from a grant of TAS
designation. Furthermore, as explained in Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
neither TAS tribes nor states truly exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the CWA. Rather, it is the federal government (pursuant to the
EPA's regulations) that requires upstream states to comply with
downstream water quality standards.
Finally, it should not be
forgotten that an underlying fundamental precept here is that the
federal government is vested with exclusive authority over relations
with Indian tribes.
The points argued by Wisconsin raised substantial questions of law.
And, although this article's position is that the Seventh Circuit
accurately disposed of the issues-Wisconsin's contentions were
formidable. So formidable that it is difficult to conceive of a stronger
challenge a state could mount in opposition to a TAS designation. Is
there really a factual scenario, as the court of appeals muses, which
could give rise to a different result?351 What feasible argument is left
347. Id.
348. Id. at 746-47.
349. Id. at 747 (internal quotations omitted).
350. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747 (internal quotations omitted).
351. In briefly exploring this question, this article assumes that a court would
scrutinize and likely reverse absolutely outrageous designations of TAS status. For
instance, if a tribe were to apply for and receive TAS status to set water quality
standards for a lake located 300 miles outside the reservation borders (and completely
unconnected through waterways to the reservation), it can be safely assumed that a
successful challenge could be brought. Here, this article will give credit to the tribes
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for a governmental entity seeking review of a TAS designation to
administer water quality standards?
1. The Waterbody Is Not Navigable
One possibility may be for a state to aver the waterbody or bodies a
tribe seeks to regulate are not "navigable waters." As discussed above,
the federal government's broad Commerce Clause jurisdiction creates
an ever-present dominant navigable servitude over the navigable
waters of the United States. Indeed, the CWA itself is borne of such
authority. 52 However, the Supreme Court made clear that "the grant
of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad,
is not unlimited."05 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court clarified that
the phrase "navigable waters" as used in the CWA carries significant
meaning. In that case, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") denied
a consortium of Chicago municipalities a permit to fill some seasonal
and permanent ponds created by abandoned gravel mining pits. The
Corps claimed it had jurisdiction to issue fill permits for the ponds
because the ponds met the definition of "navigable waters" found in
the Corps' regulations and because migratory birds that "crossed state
lines" were using the ponds.
The Court disagreed that the Corps had jurisdiction over the
ponds in the abandoned gravel pits. The Court acknowledged that
under the CWA, Congress "evidenced its intent to regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
understanding of that term,"354 but, this did not make the term
"navigable" devoid of meaning. According to the Court, the term "has
at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could be reasonably
so made."" However, the isolated ponds formed in the gravel pits
were not adjacent to navigable waters or "inseparably bound up with
the waters of the United States." 56 As a result, the Court concluded
that the ponds were not navigable waters under the CWA subject to
the Corps' jurisdiction. The fact that migratory birds used the ponds
could not be used by the Corps to bootstrap regulatory jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the court refused to hold
that "isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located within two
Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)'s definition of 'navigable waters'
and the EPA and avoid such "improbable hypotheticals." Nixon v. United States, 506

U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (StevensJ, concurring).
352. See supratext accompanying note 287.
353. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
354. Id. at 167 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
133 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
355. Id. at 172.
356. Id. at 167 (internal quotations omitted).
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because they serve as habitat for migratory birds." 57 Moreover, the
Court explained that "[p]ermitting [the Corps] to claim federal
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird
Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use.,051
This leaves open the possibility that a state could claim that TAS
jurisdiction could not be given to a tribe for a waterbody within the
reservation which is akin to an isolated pond not adjacent to navigable
waters and not "inseparably bound up with the waters of the United
States." In Wisconsin v. EPA, Judge Wood specifically noted that "here
no one disputes that the waters at issue are 'navigable waters' for
purposes of either the [CWA] or the Commerce Clause.059 Thus, a
clear inference can be drawn that a set of facts that raises significant
doubts concerning the navigability of waters a tribe seeks to regulate
may lead to an effective challenge of TAS designation.
In the final analysis, however, a "navigability" challenge would
seem an unlikely scenario. First, it would seem less likely that a tribe
would apply for TAS designation over completely isolated water bodies
in the first instance. This may not be an effective allocation of the
tribe's limited resources dedicated to environmental protection.
Protecting reservation waters from transboundary pollution is the
major impetus for tribes seeking power over its water quality standards.
If a waterbody is truly isolated and not connected to navigable bodies
of water, it is unlikely that transboundary water pollution will be a
major concern. Second, if one gives even a modicum of credit to the
EPA, one would anticipate the Agency might filter out TAS
designation claims for waters not falling under the jurisdiction of the
CWA. This is a situation where one may expect the EPA would assist a
tribe with its TAS application by dissuading requests for jurisdiction
over non-navigable waters in favor of navigable water bodies. Third, it
is questionable whether a state would care whether a tribe received
TAS status over a non-navigable waterbody within reservation
boundaries.3 If the waterbody was truly isolated from the other waters
of the state, then even extremely strict water quality standards for that
waterbody would have no restrictive effect on discharges outside the
reservation because there is nothing "upstream" from an unconnected
waterbody.
Finally, even if a tribe receives TAS status over a non-navigable
waterbody within reservation boundaries and the state protests, there
may be a standing issue. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, "state
laws may usually be applied to Indians on their reservations only if

357. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
358. Id. at 174.
359. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2001).
360. On the other hand, if a state owns fee lands within reservation borders or has
an interest in a private property owner of fee lands within the reservation, a restriction
on non-navigable waters that hinders use of the land may give rise to a jurisdictional
dispute.
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Congress so expressly provides." 6 ' So, even if the waterbody was not
navigable for purposes of the CWA, and a tribe should not have
received TAS status for it, if it is located within reservation boundaries
it is questionable whether the state could enforce its own laws
concerning the water in the first place. 62 For these reasons, while
contesting TAS status for a tribe to administer water quality standards
of a non-navigable waterbody may still be an open avenue, the
practical reality is that the likelihood of success is probably minimal.
2. Impairment of a Reservation Waterbody Will Not Have Serious and
Substantial Effects on the Political Integrity, Economic Security, or
Health or Welfare of the Tribe.
Another more obvious, albeit similarly restrictive, route for a state
to take is to argue that impairment of the waterbody or bodies a tribe
seeks to regulate will not have serious and substantial effects on the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
In other words, a state could attempt to show the waterbody simply has
no value to the tribe and any degradation of it would have no
detrimental effect on the tribe whatsoever. Recall that one of the ways
Judge Wood distinguished Wisconsin v. EPA from Wisconsin v. Baker is
that the Chippewa Tribe in Baker did not claim the conduct it sought
to regulate (public fishing and hunting) posed a threat to the political
integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe. In
Wisconsin v. EPA, both parties conceded that the waters within the
Mole Lake Reservation "are very important to the Band's economic
and physical existence. " o
Similarly, in the context of a TAS designation, if a tribe fails to
articulate how impairment of the waters it seeks to regulate will
adversely impinge on the political integrity, economic security, or
health or welfare of the tribe, a state may have a strong basis to contest
an EPA grant of TAS status. Since the EPA's generalized findings
ostensibly will be used only to supplement the tribe's factual showing
of inherent authority, a complete failure by a tribe to present facts
elucidating the importance of reservation waters to the tribe should be
insufficient to receive TAS status. However, rather than a total failure
by the tribe to provide, and the EPA to require, a sufficient factual
showing, the more likely circumstances in which a state would lodge
this type of challenge is when it believes a tribe is overstating the
importance of the reservation waters it seeks to regulate. That is, no
matter how useless or remote the waterbody, a tribe would always aver
that any impairment thereof would harm the political integrity,
economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
While taking the position that a tribe has misstated or the EPA has
361. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
362. A response to this argument is that, notwithstanding the state's inability to set
standards for reservation waters, the state would still prefer federal standards to be
used rather than those set by the tribe.
363. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 750.
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misconstrued the true significance of reservation waters may lead to
spirited debate about who is best equipped to answer such a question,
the ultimate result will likely be the same: the challenging state will be
unsuccessful. First, as a practical matter, it would seem less likely that a
tribe would waste its time and limited resources in applying for TAS
designation for water bodies that are completely irrelevant to it.
Similarly, if TAS status were granted, the tribe would be dedicating its
valuable regulatory assets to something inconsequential to the tribe.
In addition, courts will trust the EPA to make decisions concerning
the importance of reservation waters. Given the deferential standard
of review of TAS decisions, a court would be hard-pressed to substitute
its judgment in favor of the Agency's in a sensitive area such as the
Absent egregious
significance of reservation waters to tribes.
malfeasance by the EPA,3 the Agency will be considered the more
capable arbiter as to the consequences arising from impairment of
tribal water resources.
It is also difficult to conceive a factual scenario where a reservation
waterbody would be considered irrelevant to the tribe. Given the
breadth of the EPA's "generalized findings rearding the relationship
and the undemanding
of water quality to tribal health and welfare,
factual showing a tribe must make, virtually any waterbody located
within the reservation would have some effect on the tribe if impaired.
Even if a tribe does not consistently use the waterbody, is not
dependent on it for water, food, or materials, or the water is already
polluted; the traditional relationship between the waterbody and the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe
is not necessarily disconnected. It must be considered that "[N]ative
Americans have.., views that are very different from mainstream
world views and that what happens to land and resources matters a
great deal to Native Americans."5 6 Indians generally believe that all
resources on their homelands are essential and interconnected, and
thus, it would be very difficult to posit that certain water bodies lack
the requisite importance for a tribe to obtain authority over them. "In
non-Indian parlance, traditional [Indian] wisdom is systems thinking. It
is a discipline for seeing wholes, recognizing patterns and
interrelationships, and learning how to structure human actions
accordingly.""' Therefore, it would be repugnant to Indian heritage
for a state challenging TAS designation to attempt a division of
reservation water resources into those whose impairment would be
364. See supra note 342.
365. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir.
1998).
366. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide,
at
Native
Americans,
Understanding
Chapter
One:
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chapl.htm.
367. Id. (citing NATIvE HERITAGE, PERSONAL AccouNTs BY AMERICAN INDANs 1790 TO
THE PRESENT xix-xxii (Arlene Hirschfelder ed., 1995)).
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significant to a tribe's way of life and those whose impairment would
have no serious impact.
Nevertheless, there could be factual circumstances where a state
could make a compelling argument that it was arbitrary and
capricious, or otherwise contrary to law, for the EPA to grant TAS
status for certain reservation waters. For example, what if there was a
small navigable lake located on the outskirts of a reservation's
boundaries that the tribe had explicitly or impliedly "disowned" on the
day the reservation was created? The tribe constructed a barrier to the
lake so no one on reservation land could gain access to it and it was
never used for drinking, hunting, fishing, materials, industry or Indian
rituals. So, although the lake was within the reservation boundaries,
for all intents and purposes it was detached from the tribe's use and
way of life. Furthermore, the lake is connected by rivers to upstream
states, but is not connected by waterway to other water bodies in the
reservation. The tribe then applies for and receives TAS status to
administer water quality standards for the cordoned-off lake. In this
situation, a state may have a legitimate, fact-based argument that TAS
designation was improvidently granted because impairment of the
lake's water quality would not have substantial or serious effects on the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
Such hypotheticals, while not impossible, do seem extreme. In
addition, the state will encounter similar problems discussed above in
the context of a navigability challenge. Again, it would be doubtful
that a tribe would expend its resources on waters without relevance to
it. And, of course, a court will generally trust the EPA's reasonable
scrutiny of such circumstances, especially when the facts are on the
margin. There would be other hurdles as well; one would be
establishing a genuine schism between the waterbody and the health
and safety of the tribe. For instance, even if no surface waters connect
the lake to other water bodies or lands the tribe utilizes, it is very
possible that contamination of the cordoned-off lake could have a
groundwater effect potentially reaching drinking water, crops, and
other water bodies.
Furthermore, just because the tribe has chosen to detach itself
from the waterbody does not necessarily mean that it did not have
preexisting authority over it. Similarly, it does not mean the tribe will
not choose to utilize the water in the future for economic growth, food
and water, or other purposes. While the test for inherent authority
over reservation waters examines whether their impairment may
seriously or substantially affect the political integrity, economic
security, health or welfare of the tribe, there is no requirement that it
be the tribe's current political integrity, economic security, health or
welfare. Such a requirement would be counterintuitive to the whole
rationale of preventing harm to the waters before it happens. The
point is that even in the unlikely event that it could be genuinely
shown that the impairment of a reservation waterbody is currently
inconsequential to a tribe, a detrimental effect on the tribe's future
utilization of the water resource may be sufficient for the tribe to
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establish inherent authority3 s In any event, should such strange
scenarios arise, a challenging state will wage its word against the EPA's
and the tribe's as to whether the impairment of a reservation
waterbody really would be germane to the tribe. A state taking such a
stance would be wise to have a sound factual basis to avoid not only
quick defeat in the courts, but also an appearance of offensive
presumptuousness.
In sum, it appears that most of the strictly legal arguments a state
would use to contest a TAS designation, especially in the course of
judicial review of the EPA's decisions, have been foreclosed. The little
room left by the Seventh Circuit to contest TAS designation revolves
primarily around very specific factual situations, and even then,
provides little assurance that such challenges will bear any fruit. The
inexorable bottom line is that, absent entirely novel factual
circumstances, state opposition to the grant of TAS status to a tribe to
administer reservation water quality standards is futile.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH - WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to expound
thoroughly upon possible alternative approaches to water regulation
in the United States, it would be remiss to conclude without at least
superficially touching upon the subject. After all, this article foretells
the coming of a new age in water pollution regulation where
numerous Indian tribes apply for, receive, and assert the authority
made available to them by Congress in section 518(e) of the CWA and
approved by various federal courts of appeal. What if all or a majority
of the tribes located on the 278 United States Indian reservations did
in fact apply for and receive TAS status to regulate reservation water
quality? And what if these TAS tribes set water quality standards with
an extremely high level of stringency as anticipated?
Such a
situation-whether it happens relatively rapidly or at a measured
pace-theoretically has the potential to create a national water
pollution program with over 328 independent sovereigns setting water
quality standards within their borders.36" Not only would such a
situation increase the incidence of transboundary conflicts, but also it
would alter the entire character of the CWA. Is this the best way to
operate a comprehensive federal statute intended "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters?"
The fundamental problem with this framework is simple-it draws
regulatory lines along political boundaries rather than geographic
368. Such an approach raises additional questions such as whether a tribe should be
required to explain whether it actually intends to integrate the waterbody in the future

or whether it need merely raise the possibility of doing so.
369. Under the CWA, "States" includes states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3) (1994).
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boundaries. This method is incongruous to the character of the
regulated resource. The Nation's waters, the lands that surround and
affect them, and the sources of their pollution all transcend the
political boundaries of states and Indian tribes. Water pollution is an
intricate problem. An extremely broad range of chemical, physical,
and biological factors causes injury to the country's waters and their
aquatic ecosystems." Effective restoration and protection of the water
resources in this country are not amenable to easy fragmentation and
distribution of regulatory power based simply on each sovereign
controlling what will be tolerated within its borders. As aptly stated by
one commentator:
The current structure of the Clean Water Act, which vests regulatory
authority in political units unrelated to environmental geography, is
fractured along lines that lead away from either good economics or
good environmental policy. Moreover, giving tribes the status of
states under the Clean Water Act opens the fractures even wider,
something the basic principles of ecology and economics would
surely counsel against. We do not need less integrated planning on a
basinwide scale.... Political boundaries are contingencies of human
history 71we come to geographical boundaries with our hats in our
hands.
The EPA acknowledges that while the original framework of the CWA
prompted significant progress in improving the country's waters,
"[today's problems require more creative, comprehensive
solutions."3 7 The rigidity of state and reservation borders form
inflexible jigsaw-puzzle-ike regulation that is simply mismatched to the
mobile, multifaceted, and complex water resource.
This mismatch sets the stage for discord among not only states and
tribes, but also the many "on the ground" users and influencers of
water resources. "By locating regulatory authority along political
boundaries-that is, by vesting it in individual states as opposed to a
collective association of all affected parties-the Clean Water Act
inevitably begets conflicts among upstream and downstream users
asserting superior rights."073 The scale of these conflicts is not trivial.
For example, in Albuquerque v. Browner, the Isleta Pueblo tribe set its
standards for arsenic 1,000 times more stringent than New Mexico's
standards, and almost 2,500 times more stringent than the EPA's
standard for safe consumption.
In addition, the level of the arsenic
that occurred naturally in the Rio Grande was above the levels set by
the tribe so that even if Albuquerque's wastewater was 100 percent
pure when discharged, the arsenic levels in the reservation waters

370. Adler, supra note 12, at 204.
371. Harbison, supra note 66, at 495.
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would still have exceeded the tribal standards.7 5 To comply with the
arsenic standard, Albuquerque would have been "required to build a
reverse osmosis tertiary level treatment facility at a capital cost of
$250,000,000, with approximately 26 million dollars per year in
operating costs." 7 6 According to Albuquerque, the term "comply" in
these circumstances is somewhat misleading because the treatment
facility would serve no real purpose. The tribe's arsenic standard was
"below levels measurable by modem laboratory equipment [and] the
ambient level [of arsenic would] never improve due to the natural
background conditions in the groundwater." " In the end, however,
Albuquerque lost. The point here is that the tensions created by the
CWA are real and substantial, and that the border-based framework
can lead to sub-optimal results. Add a considerable number of TAS
tribes to the mix, and the friction increases exponentially.7 '
So what is all this talk of "geographical boundaries" and how do
they work in the water regulation context? The concept of regulating
water pollution using "geographical boundaries" simply means
regulation and management on a watershed basis. As mentioned
earlier, a watershed is:
[T]he land area that drains water to a particular stream, river, or lake.
It is a land feature that can be identified by tracing a line along the
highest elevations between two areas on a map, often a ridge. Large
watersheds, like the Mississippi River basin contain thousands of
smaller watersheds.379
Thus, the borders of sovereigns do not define watersheds.
"Watersheds are nature's boundaries. They are the areas that drain to
water bodies, including lakes, rivers, estuaries, wetlands, streams, and
the surrounding landscape. Groundwater recharge areas are also
considered."'80 The idea is that by regulating swaths of naturally
375. Id
376. Id.
377. Id. at 903.
378. The EPA's regulations (required by Congress in section 518(e) of the CWA)
setting forth a dispute resolution mechanism for disputes arising between states and
tribes as a result of differing water quality standards on common bodies of water are
not the panacea for these conflicts. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (2001). The regulations provide
for two mechanisms. The first is mediation in which the EPA appoints a mediator who
simply acts as a neutral facilitator "whose function is to encourage communication and
negotiation between all parties to the dispute." Id. § 131.7(f)(1)(ii). The mediation
process has no binding effect on the parties. The second mechanism provided for is
arbitration. Under this process, "[t]he parties are not obligated to abide by the
arbitrator's or arbitration panel's recommendation unless they voluntarily entered
into a binding agreement to do so." Id. § 131.7(0(2)(iv). Participation in either
mediation or arbitration is strictly voluntary. Id. § 131.7(0 (1) (i), (f) (2), (f) (3). Thus,
it is arguable the dispute resolution mechanism, although venerable in name and
concept, lacks efficacy to solve transboundary conflicts.
379. U.S.
Geological
Survey,
Water Science
Glossary of
Terms,
at
http://wwwga.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html.
380. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, EPA's Most
Frequently Asked Questions Related to Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, at
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interrelated lands and aquatic ecosystems, water pollution is being
addressed on a more holistic and thoughtful level rather than looking
one-dimensionally at sovereign borders. The EPA observed that,
"because watersheds are defined by natural hydrology, they represent
the most logical basis for managing water resources. The resource
becomes the focal point, and managers are able to gain a more
complete understanding of overall conditions in an area and the
stressors which affect those conditions.""8 ' The ultimate hope of
watershed management is optimal pollution control with minimal
conflict.
Watershed management is a broad area, and is the subject of
extensive writing. It is only cursorily touched upon in this article to
show that stark divisions between TAS tribes, states, and other
interested parties in the water pollution arena do not necessarily have
to be the norm. A watershed management development plan typically
follows certain distinct phases: watersheds are identified and mapped;
the "stakeholders" in the watershed including federal, state, tribal, and
local agencies are assembled to analyze threats to the watershed and to
devise responses to these threats; the selected responses are applied to
the watershed; and progress in achieving water quality goals are
regularly monitored, with adjustments made as necessary. The effort
is aimed at being a cooperative, integrated approach, devoid of power
mongering and autocracy.
The EPA has articulated three "guiding principles" on which to
build all watershed programs. The first is "partnerships,"whereby those
parties "most affected by management decisions are involved
throughout and shape key decisions.""' This, according to the EPA,
"ensures that environmental objectives are well integrated with those
for economic stability and other social and cultural goals. It also
provides that the people who depend upon natural resources within
the watersheds are well informed of and participate in planning and
implementation activities.""' The second principle is a "geographic
focus," which changes the boundaries for water pollution management
to those created by nature rather than the mere political borders of
sovereigns.35 The third is "sound management techniques based on strong
science and data," whereby the stakeholders in the watershed collectively
employ sound science to set goals, implement action plans, and
monitor results.3 M The idea behind this approach is that "actions are
http://www.epa.gov/owow/questions.html (emphasis added).
381. EPA
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based upon shared information and a common understanding of the
roles, priorities, and responsibilities of all involved parties." , The
obvious motivation and hopeful result of these idealistic guiding
principles is to manage and reduce water pollution with a minimum of
conflict.
To accomplish this, entire jurisdictions are divided into geographic
management units based on hydrologic connections, with existing
regulatory programs and political boundaries "factored into" decisions
about the formation of the units.m Thus, the regulatory framework is
founded upon the practical realities of how water pollution really
works and merely adds in the existence of political boundaries as a
supplemental, but not primary, consideration. States, tribes, and local
interests can then compare priorities, develop plans, reach
compromises, and "leverage their limited resources to meet common
goals."" 9 The result is a water pollution regulatory system that
transcends political borders by defining and regulating water using
hydrologic boundaries, and fostering cooperation by all stakeholders
in the watershed from the outset.
So, unlike the confrontational posture the state/TAS tribe
dichotomy creates, the watershed approach envisions cooperative
efforts from those affected and affecting the waterbodies of the
country. By creating an atmosphere of teamwork between states, TAS
tribes, local governments, and individual parties, "the watershed
approach can build a sense of community, reduce conflicts, increase
commitment to the actions necessary to meet societal goals and,
ultimately, improve the likelihood of sustaining long-term
environmental improvements.""' The EPA believes that states and
tribes are the principal players in implementing a watershed approach
because they already manage many of the existing water and natural
resource protection programs."' Indeed, "[ft or the long term, EPA
envisions locally-driven, watershed-based activities embedded in
comprehensive 92state and tribal watershed approaches all over the
United States."
Implementing such a utopian paradigm is, of course, no simple
94
matter.393 And, multi-party settings have their own set of difficulties.
The EPA, however, is taking major steps to encourage watershed
management and provide support for its development. The Agency

387. Id.
388. Id. (emphasis added).
Watershed
Approach
Framework,
at
389. EPA
Office
of
Water,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework.html.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See generally William Goldfarb, WatershedManagement: Slogan or Solution ? 21 B.C.
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394. See Harbison, supra note 66, at 491-92 (explaining certain potential difficulties
in watershed management with multiple parties involved that, while formidable, are
not insuperable).
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has made a "[c]onsiderable effort... in streamlining program
administrative requirements that hinder watershed approaches and
" 9s
[has invested] in developing useful watershed tools and services.
The EPA has also recognized the damaging nature of transboundary
conflicts to internal political relations as well as to the protection of
the country's water resources. The Agency's Office of Water has
announced that it has put a "[h]igh priority... on developing and
supporting comprehensive state and tribal watershed approach
strategies that actively involve public and private interests at all levels
to achieve environmental protection."396 Thus, the push is on to
fundamentally change the model of water regulation in this country to
a watershed approach, and this article submits that such a plan is a
potent alternative to the divisions and conflicts inevitably produced by
the current framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Wisconsin
v. EPA was important in that it both confirmed TAS Indian tribes'
status as co-equal sovereigns for authorized functions under the CWA,
and correctly foreclosed the most feasible legal challenges to a tribe's
TAS designation. In fact, it now appears that in all practicality, any
opposition by a state to the grant of TAS status is futile. Put simply,
the court's opinion and the EPA's regulations and operating
procedures make clear that TAS status to administer water quality
standards is available for the tribes' taking. The importance of water
resources to tribes and this latest affirmation of the ease in which TAS
status may be obtained will likely persuade many Indian tribes to direct
their limited environmental resources to obtaining control over
reservation waters. As more tribes assert this control, transboundary
water pollution conflicts will increase on a scale not yet seen. The
EPA, however, is trying to stem this potential tide of conflict and
discord between sovereigns by redrawing the regulatory lines to those
created by hydrologic boundaries rather than those marking political
borders. Such watershed management practices envision cooperation
over conflict and environmental protection over environmental
protectionism. Thus, the CWA itself is at a crossroads. It will be up to
at
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the CWA's integral participants-the EPA, states, and empowered
Indian tribes-to take the path that restores and protects the water
resources of the United States while also preserving and protecting a
cooperative spirit among its inhabitants.

